

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



# Bulletin

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 986

May 19, 1958

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*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

# The Strategy of Peace

*Address by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

There is nothing mysterious about the goals of United States foreign policy. It seeks to defend and advance the interests of the United States. These interests are of several kinds:

(1) There is the life of our people and the physical safety of our homeland. These would be endangered by war.

(2) There is the well-being of our economy. This would be gravely impaired if hostile forces dictated the pattern of world trade.

(3) There is the integrity of the principles for which our nation was founded. Our nation is more than population, more than real estate. Our nation represents ideals. These ideals are an integral part of America, to be defended and promoted by our foreign policy.

Now let me comment briefly on these three aspects of our foreign policy.

## Peace

We defend our people and our homeland against armed attack by having the power to hit back hard at anyone who attacks us or our allies. This causes any potential aggressor to pause, for he knows that he could not, by aggression, gain as much as he would stand to lose. In order to have that assured capacity to strike back we need co-operation with other countries.

Potential aggressors need to be put on notice that they cannot, with impunity, pick up nations one by one, leaving the United States to the last, when even we will be relatively weak. Accord-

ingly, we have made collective-defense treaties and similar arrangements with nearly 50 other countries. These commit each nation to help the other in the event of armed attack.

A further benefit from these arrangements is that under them the burden of the military effort is shared. For example, the ground forces of the cooperating free-world nations amount to about 5.6 million men. But only about 950,000 of these are American.

Also our Strategic Air Command is afforded well dispersed positions around the world. This dispersal greatly increases the effectiveness of the deterrent.

Our collective-security arrangements are serviced by our mutual security program. It supplies our allies with a certain amount of military equipment. In a few cases it helps them financially to maintain military establishments which are needed but which their economies are too poor to support without some outside help. And we provide development assistance to certain less developed free-world countries. We do that to help them build their societies on the principles of freedom and to escape pressure to turn to the Communist bloc with the peril to liberty which that involves.

The Soviet Union tries hard to disrupt our defensive efforts. It portrays the United States as militaristic and our collective-defense groupings as "aggressive military blocs."

Of course, as you and I know, the American people are among the least militaristic of any people in the world. George Washington called upon us to maintain what he called a "respectable defensive posture." By that he meant a military

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Atomic Power Institute sponsored by the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs at Durham, N. H., on May 2 (press release 239 and 239-A).

posture strong enough so that others would respect it. Unfortunately, we have not always done that. At times our military strength has been so negligible that militaristic despots treated us as a cipher, not to be taken into account in their aggressive plan.

We are trying not to commit that fault again. We do not intend to make ourselves weak merely because the Soviet imperialists urge that we do so to prove our "idealism."

Our collective arrangements are defensive, as specifically authorized by the United Nations Charter. These groupings are more than expedients. They introduce a fresh concept into the structure of world order.

Within our own country and every civilized country, local security is sought on a collective basis. We unite to provide a central police force, a central fire department, and the like.

Now at last, within the free world, we are beginning to apply that enlightened collective concept. In that way weaker nations can be made secure from being picked up one by one. In that way a strong nation can avoid having to become a garrison state and, even then, being encircled and strangled as a result of the smaller nations being picked up one by one. On a collective basis nations get maximum security at minimum cost.

No doubt our people would not hesitate to provide the vast funds needed for our solitary defense, and our youth, if necessary, would give a greatly increased measure of their time to military service. But even with that maximum effort we would be less secure.

Every American who wants to see his country safe and solvent ought to get out and actively support our mutual security program now before the Congress.

#### **Economic Welfare**

Our foreign policy also tries to assure our people a prosperous home economy. That depends in good part upon foreign trade. Our exports are running at a rate approaching \$20 billion a year. Our foreign trade employs about 4.5 million people. Our imports provide many important things that we need and could not readily, or at all, produce here at home. Furthermore, our trade relations help to keep the free world together. Without ample trade with the United States many countries would be virtually forced

to accept absorption into the Communist economic bloc.

The major expression of our foreign trade policy is the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. The principle of the act was first adopted in 1934, and 10 times the Congress has acted to renew it. Under it our trade has flourished. In 1934 our total foreign trade—exports and imports—amounted to \$3.7 billion. Last year it amounted to \$32.4 billion, *excluding* military exports.

The latest renewal expires next month, and further extension is now being sought from the Congress. Failure to extend would be a major disaster. A very few might temporarily benefit. But very many, and in the long run all, would suffer gravely.

Surely we do not want to go back to the early 1930's. Then our high tariff and monetary devaluation policies wreaked havoc upon international trade and boosted into power, in Germany and Japan, extreme nationalists who later plunged the world into World War II.

Every American who wants to see his country economically sound, who wants allies, and who wants peace should work for the extension of our Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

#### **Ideals**

Let me speak now about our efforts to promote the ideals of America.

Our nation was founded by men of religious faith. They believed that our Declaration of Independence was not merely rhetoric but truth and that all men were in fact endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights. They believed that they had a mission to help men everywhere to have the opportunity to exercise their God-given rights.

Under the impulsion of their faith and works there developed here an area of unusual spiritual, intellectual, and economic vigor. It became known as the Great American Experiment. The ideals that stimulated it have been projected throughout the world. They have more than once helped to turn back the tides of despotism.

America would not be America if it were stripped of such idealism.

The values of personal liberty are, of course, best demonstrated by individuals. It is they who have liberty, and it is their use of liberty that can make it a dynamic force. On the other hand,



their misuse of liberty plays into the hands of despots. That means that individuals should exercise self-discipline and self-sacrifice and not turn liberty into license. The individual deportment of free Americans is the most decisive force, for good or evil, in the present contest with despotism.

I do not imply that government has no part to play. It too can find ways to reflect the ideals of the people whom it serves.

Government may *not* interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. That is contrary to accepted international law and practice and forbidden by many of our treaty engagements. But your Government can, and does, make clear to all the world what are the ideals for which our nation was founded.

We can, and do, refuse through our Government to give official sanction to the oppression of other peoples and the denial to them of the rights by which they are endowed by their Creator.

Your Government can, and does, see to it that captive peoples know that they are not forgotten and that their hopes for freedom have the sanction of a vast mass of world opinion.

#### **World Order**

One of the ways to protect and advance the interests of our people is by strengthening the fabric of world order. Peace will never be secure until there is an adequate body of international law, and effective means of enforcing that law, and means of changing that law as needed to promote justice.

The United Nations was a great step forward. It was largely a United States initiative. But its Security Council is hobbled by the veto power.

President Eisenhower recently proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council should exercise greater restraint in the use of the veto power. The Soviet Union reacted violently against that proposal. Nevertheless, we shall persist in seeking to strengthen the United Nations.

We seek, under its auspices, a rule of law for such newly developing areas as Antarctica and outer space. A law-of-the-sea conference has just been concluded at Geneva as an effort to create and modernize international law. The 86 nations attending reached agreement on important segments of that law. We are making progress in this field.

Still, the United Nations has not yet found the way to guarantee law and order. That is why we

have to maintain the system of regional collective-defense arrangements to which I have referred and which the charter authorizes. It is our ardent hope, however, that the United Nations can more and more be the framework within which all may find justice and peace.

#### **Agreements With the U.S.S.R.**

In the meanwhile, there is an immediate problem that concerns us greatly: Can we reach agreements with the Soviet Government which would mitigate the sharpness of our conflict and reduce the danger of friction which could flare into war?

I can assure you that that is constantly in our minds. There are, however, great difficulties.

For one thing, the Communists do not look upon agreements as we do. We consider ourselves bound to live up to our agreements. This is important because nations, unlike individuals, are under no superior force that compels them to live up to their promises.

But the Communists feel no obligation to perform their agreements. They have broken one agreement after another, confirming what Lenin said that, to the Communists, "promises are like pie crusts, made to be broken." It would obviously be reckless for the free world to weaken itself merely in reliance of Soviet promises to perform in the future.

A second obstacle is that the purposes of the Communist rulers are so basically acquisitive and aggressive that there is very little common ground between them and us.

Recent exchanges of views with the Soviet Union disclose their negotiating goals. They want:

- (1) Our acceptance of Soviet Communist domination of the nations of Eastern Europe. They want us to abandon there the concept of our Declaration of Independence and the explicit provisions of the Atlantic Charter and of the Yalta agreements, that the peoples of these countries are entitled to choose the form of government under which they will live;

- (2) Our acceptance of the continued partition of Germany, or its reunification only on conditions that would give the Communist puppet regime in East Germany an opportunity to extend its rule over all of Germany;

- (3) Liquidation of our collective-defense associations, such as NATO, and abandonment by the

United States of the concept and practice of collective security;

(4) United States recognition of Communist China, its seating in the United Nations with veto power on the Security Council, and acknowledgment of the Chinese Communist claim to Taiwan (Formosa);

(5) Elimination of the present trade controls by which the free world avoids sending strategic war goods into the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Each of these objectives represents an immense gain for the Soviet Union and a great loss to the free world. Soviet propaganda suggests that, if we would accept these losses, then the Communists might end the cold war. However, Mr. Khrushchev has, in other contexts, stated that it was inevitable that the cold war should go on and he intended that it should go on.

It would be reckless to weaken the free world on the gamble that that would end the cold war. It is more likely that it would continue under far more difficult conditions for us.

A few days ago Mr. Khrushchev said in Moscow: "We Bolsheviks are ravenous people. What we achieved through struggles in the past is not sufficient for us. We want more—tomorrow." They already have a billion people—and are still ravenous. I wonder how many more they need before their appetite is sated.

Now I do not, of course, conclude that there are no areas for useful agreement.

In 1953 we made an armistice agreement with the Communists which ended the fighting in Korea.

In 1955 we, with the British and the French, concluded with the Soviet Union the state treaty that liberated Austria.

Earlier this year the United States concluded with the Soviet Union a cultural exchange agreement of limited scope.

We believe that there can be other carefully negotiated agreements of mutual interest. We have been trying hard to get an agreement for reciprocal inspection in the Arctic area. The Soviet Government professed to fear our air maneuvers in the north. It took these alleged fears to the United Nations Security Council and complained of our activities.<sup>2</sup> We explained that we needed to keep some planes in the air all the

time because we fear that a massive and sudden surprise attack might be launched over the top of the world. So to allay both fears we proposed international inspection on both sides of the Arctic area to give assurance that there could not be any surprise or accidental attack.<sup>3</sup> The matter came to a vote just a few hours ago. Ten of the 11 members of the Security Council supported our proposal. There was only one vote against—that of the Soviet Union. But that one negative vote constituted a veto. So, at the choice of the Soviet Union, the fears and risks continue. They continue for one reason alone, and that is because the Soviet Union rejects international inspection against surprise attack.

The significance of that is frightening. The result is tragic. It means that at the will and choice of the Soviet Union we have to go on living on the edge of an awful abyss from which we could, so readily, be rescued if only the Soviet Union did not insist upon retaining for itself the possibility of massive surprise attack.

But we refuse to be discouraged. We remain willing to join in any dependable arrangement which will reduce the risk of surprise or accidental attack or, on a fair basis, reduce armaments.

### The Strategy of Victory

We must, however, assume that we face a long period of effort, sacrifice, and strain. That will come to an end when the Soviet rulers moderate their imperialist and ideological urges.

Today the Soviet Communist rulers seek to implement their materialistic doctrine. They believe that human beings are in effect material particles to be fitted together as cogs in some well-oiled machine. Also they believe that that "fitting together" should be carried out throughout the world under Soviet Communist dictation. They profess to believe that this would assure world harmony, peace, and maximum productivity. All of this is a way of rationalizing the usual desire of despots for more and more power.

Experience, however, is teaching the Soviet rulers what has been taught so many times before, that man is *not* just a vivacious particle of matter. Men have souls and minds and individuality. They can never for long be forced into con-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 12, 1958, p. 760.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 816.

formity. The Soviet Communist Party has undertaken the impossible, as they are beginning to learn.

They are learning a lesson in the satellite countries. A former adherent, Yugoslavia, is independent. In the other Eastern European countries there is a sustained and growing demand for independence. It has manifested itself in violent outbreaks that occurred in 1953 in East Germany and in 1956 in Poland and, most conspicuously, in Hungary in late 1956. There has been a constant flow of refugees from East Germany into West Germany.

In the case of the revolts and in the case of the refugees it is the youth who figure most largely. Throughout their mature lives they have never known anything but intense Communist indoctrination and discipline. But love of God and love of country still survive. Human differences still persist. No materialistic regime can wholly or permanently crush them out. Sooner or later the Soviet rulers are going to have to face up to these practical facts. Indeed there are occasional signs that they are already beginning to do so.

Even within the Soviet Union itself the Communist Party finds that human beings cannot be forced into a single mold of conformity. Under Stalin this was sought to be effected by the brutal terrorism of the secret police. There was a revulsion against that, and the system has been moderated.

As the Soviet Union competes in the field of modern weapons and modern industrial techniques, increasing numbers have to be given a high degree of education. Thus there is developed an intelligentsia. And minds trained for one purpose cannot be kept thinking merely in the channels that the party chooses. They think about other matters, including the unsoundness of the Communist dogma and the cheapness of Communist slogans.

There is more personal security and independent thinking within the Soviet Union now than there has ever been since the October 1917 revolution.

The Soviet economic centralization has proved unworkable, and now there is economic decentralization. This means more local administration of affairs, with more regard to local differences and local habits.

There has also been a change in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union. In 1939, and between 1945 and 1950, it resorted primarily to violence. It attacked Poland and Finland. It took over Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by military occupation. It assisted, and in some cases instigated, Communist warfare in China, Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, and Indochina. It used force or the threat of force to take over Czechoslovakia and to blockade Berlin. It backed open war in Korea.

But these violent techniques no longer pay off. They are checked by the free-world network of collective security. So the Soviet rulers now smile and pretend to be friends and to adopt what they hope will be winning ways, giving aid in the form of trade, technicians, and loans, and giving pleasure through ballets and the like. In this way the Soviet Union has gained increased influence and acceptability as against the time when it only growled and bared its teeth. But it is impossible to go on smiling for a long time without its having an internal effect on character. In the long run a nation, like an individual, tends to become what it pretends to be.

The essential is that, for this long run, the free world should stay strong and united. It must be willing to make the sacrifices needed to prevent the Soviet rulers from gaining external victories bringing new victims into the Communist camp. That would enhance the prestige of the Communist extremists and embolden them and enable them to hold back the evolutionary trends at work within the Soviet bloc.

The United States, as the strongest of the free nations, can contribute immensely to giving evolutionary forces of freedom a chance to make themselves decisively felt.

President Eisenhower, speaking at Paris last December at the NATO meeting, said that "there is a noble strategy of victory—not victory over any peoples but victory for all peoples."<sup>4</sup>

The essential is that the American people hold fast to the ideals bequeathed us by our founders and implement those ideals with courage that is traditional with us. We shall need a sustained, sacrificial effort. We may have to do some of the things that we do in war—but without the killing and being killed.

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

Why should we not make that effort? The stakes are perhaps the greatest for which men have ever had to strive, in peace or in war. And, if we strive aright, these stakes can be won in peace, without the awful horror of world war III. Surely for the averting of war and the safeguarding of freedom men should be willing

to make a sustained and sacrificial effort. We can do so in confidence that peaceful victory is attainable and that our efforts can bring the day when the dark shadows which now oppress humanity will give way to an era of light and gladness.

## Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 1

Press release 236 dated May 1

*Secretary Dulles:* I have a statement which I would like to make. I understand that copies of it have been made available to you.<sup>1</sup>

I should like to make some observations regarding the United States resolution before the United Nations Security Council, which calls for the establishment of an Arctic inspection zone.<sup>2</sup>

The establishment of international inspection in an Arctic zone is proposed by the United States not as a maneuver, not as propaganda, but in a sincere effort to meet the admitted problems of a particular area. The United States, not only publicly but privately, has done its best to make clear to the Soviet Government the sincerity of its purpose and its desire to avoid turning this grave matter into a propaganda battle.

The Soviet Government has said that it is worried by the flights of United States aircraft in this area. We have said that we need to keep planes aloft because we are fearful that the Soviets may launch a nuclear attack against us over the top of the world.<sup>3</sup> It seemed to us that, if both sides are animated by really peaceful intentions, there is a natural solution—that is to have international inspection which would allay the fears on both sides. If the Soviets do not have bomber and missile bases in the north of their country available for a sudden surprise attack upon the United States,

then our own problem of security is greatly altered. Perhaps we would then feel it safe greatly to minimize the flights of which the Soviet Union complains. In any event the Soviet Union would know that any United States flights are so safeguarded, beyond risk of misadventure, that they cannot be a threat to the Soviet Union unless the Soviet Union first attacks.

The establishment of one important zone of international inspection, as proposed by the United States, would be a constructive first step toward easing world tensions. It is a step that can be taken at once without awaiting any high-level conference. The United States believes that an addition, along the lines proposed by Sweden, is totally consistent with this initiative. It is also consistent with the position taken by the United States regarding a possible heads-of-government meeting.

We continue to believe that the present situation requires that every attempt be made to reach agreement on the main problems affecting the maintenance of peace and stability in the world. In the circumstances a summit meeting would be desirable if it would provide opportunity for conducting serious discussions of major problems and would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects. Before a summit meeting can take place, however, preparatory work is required so that some assurance can be given that meaningful agreements can be achieved.

We believe the discussions initiated by certain governments in Moscow can constitute a useful prior preparatory phase before any possible sum-

<sup>1</sup> The following six paragraphs were also released separately as press release 234 dated May 1.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 816.

<sup>3</sup> For a statement made in the Security Council on Apr. 21 by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, see BULLETIN of May 12, 1958, p. 760.



mit meeting. Similarly, we believe that the steps contemplated by the United States resolution before the Council, in addition to their intrinsic merit, could also serve, as the Swedish Government suggests, as a useful prelude for the discussion of the disarmament problem at any possible summit meeting. We therefore hope that the U.S.S.R. will agree to sit down with the interested states at once to begin the necessary technical discussions looking toward the establishment of an Arctic inspection zone.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Russians were to accept an Arctic inspection system, would we abandon or modify our present "fail safe" system?*

A. I say in this statement that the question of what we would do would depend upon what we learn as a result of inspection. I cannot tell you in advance what that would be.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the reason I ask the question—if there were an inspection system, it would seem to be inconsistent with the takeoff flights of planes in the Arctic at a time when the inspector would be there, and it would be difficult to see how the present system of unilateral flights, based on our radar installations, could be continued if there were international inspection.*

A. I have the strong belief that, if there were established this international inspection system, it would, in fact, lead to a considerable modification of our practices. That assumes that we do not find, or the international inspection system does not find, something that is so alarming that it makes it necessary to continue. On that assumption, and the assumption the inspection system would give us a more effective notice of a possible attack than we get now when we are dependent on radar information, which is not always reliable in the first instance—then I would think the other precautions would be moderated.

#### **The Inspection Area**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Russian reaction—Mr. Gromyko's reaction—the other day was, in part, that it did not include any of the United States excluding Alaska whereas it includes part of the Soviet Union. Is the area described by Mr. Lodge in the United Nations negotiable, or is it that area of the Arctic and nothing else?*

A. Well, I don't think it is anything that we would haggle about in detail. A few changes or variations here and there, I suppose, would not be objectionable. But, broadly speaking, this is the area which we think should be covered now, and we do not want to get into areas which are remote from that particular area and which carry with them a whole new set of political problems.

This area was thought of as a useful beginning place for two reasons: first because it is an area of very high strategic importance, second because it is relatively free from the political complications that exist, for example, in Europe; so, consistently with that principle, we would want to stick at this stage to that particular area.

I don't say that the particular details are sacrosanct. For instance, our resolution suggests that we would be glad to include the portions of Sweden and of Finland and, I think, a little bit of Iceland, which are not in the zone as was originally proposed. That indicates that we are not totally inflexible on the subject.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify one point, you said our flights would depend on whether we found something so alarming as to warrant their continuation. Is it likely the Russians would leave, in an area to be inspected, something so alarming as to warrant continuation of the American flights?*

A. I think it unlikely. I think it almost certain that, if there were inspection, that would allay the fears of sudden surprise attack to a degree that might make these flights unnecessary.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your statement you thought this plan could be put into effect without awaiting any high-level conference. If the Soviets continue to insist that this be discussed at a summit conference, would we have any objection?*

A. Well, of course we don't know yet whether there will be any summit conference. If there is going to be a summit conference and if the preparatory work shapes up in that way, I assume that it would be something we would be prepared to discuss. I will say that the attitude of the Soviet Union at this time toward that matter would, I suppose, have a bearing upon or influence our own thinking as to the value of the summit conference.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your statement that the seriousness of the purpose of the United States has been put forward both privately and*



*publicly. Could you illustrate what you meant by that? Was it a message from the President to Prime Minister Khrushchev?*

A. There was a message which I gave to the Soviet Ambassador here on Saturday afternoon, which I made with the authority of the President. There was also a private meeting at about the same time in New York between Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Sobolev, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations.

*Q. Was the Soviet reaction in private as shocked and hostile as it was in public?*

A. I would say that there was not the use of some of the extravagant phrases that were used by Mr. Gromyko. But the initial reaction wasn't exactly heartwarming. (Laughter)

*Q. These two incidents you just spoke of, Mr. Secretary—does it indicate, in your opinion, any new phase in developments between this Government and the Soviet Government in the context of actually getting off the ground in private conversations?*

A. Well, I can hardly overstate my view that, if something of this sort [Arctic inspection zone] got started, it might mark a real turning point in this whole cold-war situation. I attach very great importance to it, and that is the reason why we have tried so hard to avoid seeming to make it a propaganda exercise or just a maneuver. We have tried to make it clear to the Soviet Union that we did take this very seriously and we are extremely anxious, if possible, to make good.

You see, this offer to get started, at least with technicians, on this area has been along the lines we have been thinking about for some time. If we could get started even at that level, and as a preliminary to any heads-of-government meeting, it would make it much more likely that a heads-of-government meeting could do something substantial.

If there is no preliminary work which clears away the underbrush in some of these matters, it is not very easy for me to see the ability of the heads of government themselves to make any meaningful decision. It would be a good deal, I am afraid, like the last summit meeting, where the heads of government agreed on a directive to be carried out by the foreign ministers. The foreign ministers found themselves unable to carry it out, so the whole effect was zero.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Ambassador on Saturday indicate, as Mr. Sobolev did on Tuesday, that any agreement on an Arctic zone must be part of a package deal and their package, which includes a banning of nuclear weapons altogether?*

A. I did not get any immediate response from the Ambassador when I informed him about this.

#### U. S. Disarmament "Package" Broken

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the fact that you offered this separately—does it mean that to an extent we have broken our own package?*

A. Yes, it means to that extent we have broken the package. However, as you will recall, the original proposal of President Eisenhower for an open-skies inspection system<sup>4</sup> and his acceptance, as a supplement of that, of the Soviet proposal for ground posts<sup>5</sup> was put forward as a prelude to what you might call disarmament talks. You see, an inspection system is not disarmament. It doesn't take any arms away from anybody. But it could create, and I believe it would create, an atmosphere under which a genuine disarmament would, in fact, take place. It was put forward by President Eisenhower at Geneva in 1955 as a step which, if taken, would make it possible thereafter to take disarmament steps. So that, while it was included as part of the total package that was presented to the Soviets last August in London,<sup>6</sup> it has never, in the contemplation of the United States, been a step which we would be unwilling to take unless other steps were also taken. We were willing to take it believing, if it were taken, other steps, in fact, would be taken.

*Q. Have other parts of the package also been separated out or broken, Mr. Secretary?*

A. Only to the extent of our willingness to begin technical studies of the problems involved without prejudice—as it was put in our last note to the Soviet Union<sup>7</sup>—to the position of any government as to their interdependence or separability.

*Q. That means that the testing issue and the cutoff of production of fissionable materials are still linked together?*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 811.

A. They have not yet been disjointed, although we are prepared to have studies carried on as to how you would supervise a suspension of tests without anybody being committed on the proposition of whether or not that was to be interconnected with the cutoff, for example, of fissionable material or other aspects of the disarmament package.

*Q. Are those studies to be conducted within this Government, or are these international studies that you are talking about?*

A. Well, those would have to be conducted, presumably, on an international basis—the ones you are speaking about.

#### **Relations With the United Arab Republic**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if you could change the subject for a moment, sir, the Suez Canal compensation issue has been settled, and we have unblocked Egypt's funds in this country. On the other hand, President Nasser has gone on a visit to Russia. I wonder, sir, if you would care to give us your thinking as to what all this portends in terms of America's relations with the United Arab Republic in the immediate or near future.*

A. The unblocking of these funds<sup>\*</sup> came about because the reason for their blocking ceased to exist. They were blocked, in the first instance, because of the fact that there was an unresolved legal controversy between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Canal Authority as to who was entitled to collect tolls. There was a danger that American ships, which were paying the tolls to the Egyptian Canal Authority, might still be subject to being sued and a judgment given against them in the American courts on the theory that the confiscation decree was not effective and they should pay the canal company. I have pointed out, I think, several times that that was the reason why the funds were blocked and when that situation came to an end they would be unblocked. Therefore, I would not think it was wise to try to read into the unblocking any significance beyond what automatically attaches to it because of the fact that the reason for the blocking has ceased; therefore, the unblocking becomes virtually automatic.

Now, as far as our general relations are concerned, I have said here before that we hope to get

along in a correct, friendly way with the United Arab Republic. We recognized it on the assumption that it would conduct itself in a way that would be consistent with the peace and security of the area, and on that assumption we would expect to have normal and, we hope, friendly relations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the occasion of Nasser's visit to Moscow one of the leading Soviet economic papers came out with a major article directed to the Arab nations, pointing out that their resources are being exploited for the benefit of the capitalist world, according to this article, and suggesting that they take some action to take over their oil themselves and also hinting that, if they do, they will not be left in the position of the Iranians, unable to exploit them, meaning Soviet technicians would come, perhaps, and help them. I wonder if you could give us your comment on the significance of this report at the time when Nasser is in Moscow.*

A. The problem as to the use of the oil resources relates not to the technical problem of being able to produce the oil or refine it. Many people can do that. The problem is the marketing of the oil. The Soviet Union cannot provide a market for the oil. It is itself an exporter of petroleum products. The problem is to find the marketing facilities. When the Abadan refinery was closed down, the difficulty arose for Iran because the seizure was not recognized as legal and, in consequence, the companies which had the distributing facilities, the marketing facilities, refused to handle the oil. If anyone thinks that a pool of oil in the Middle East is of value by itself, I think he is mistaken. The value is derived not only from the oil but from facilities for distributing and marketing.

#### **Why U. S. Bombers Are Kept Aloft**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some of the reasons why this Arctic inspection system would make it safe for us to curtail our SAC flights, our bomber flights?*

A. If there were international facilities which satisfied us by inspection, which is more dependable than radar inspection at a distance, that there were not, in fact, any plane or missile bases prepared for the takeoff of planes or missiles toward the United States, then that would diminish

<sup>\*</sup> See p. 830.

the occasion to have our planes constantly in the air. They are in the air now because of the fact that, with a growing missile capacity, they could be destroyed on the ground over a large area with virtually no notice—a matter of 10 or 15 minutes, during which planes could not be gotten off the ground. Therefore, it is prudent to keep a certain number of planes flying as against that risk. Now, if an inspection system demonstrates that that risk is not present, then the reason for keeping the planes aloft would correspondingly diminish.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, about a month or 6 weeks ago Mr. Gromyko and the Kremlin were making various proposals along easing East-West tensions and you were standing where you are now and saying this was a lot of propaganda. Now Mr. Gromyko seems to be in the same position; he is calling news conferences in the Narkomindel and saying that our proposals on the Arctic inspection plan are also propaganda. Now, I wonder, did this happen because of a change of our policy, or a change of their policy, or a little of both, or what?*

A. You mean as to why they call it propaganda?

*Q. No, the position seems to have been changed. I would like to know your assessment.*

A. The circumstances are that we have conducted this operation in a way which is designed to make as clear as we can that it was not a propaganda exercise but we were seeking an honest result. We talked to the Soviets about it 2 days before we introduced our resolution. We would have been willing to talk about it with them outside to any extent that they wanted. I think that kind of approach differentiates it a good deal from when you write a letter purported to be signed by the head of the Soviet Government to the President of the United States and then publish it before we can get it translated.

#### **"Soldiers of Fortune" in Indonesia**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a question about Indonesia. Yesterday the President said there were American soldiers of fortune, as he put it, meddling in the Indonesian rebellion. Can you tell me whether this Government has any way of stopping that, any control over American citizens?*

A. I don't think that the President said that there were Americans there because, as a matter of fact, I don't think we know. He said that it could be they were there. There are Americans around the world who engage in such enterprises. I know today we are alerted to the fact that it may be possible that some Americans are flying Soviet arms into Yemen. I don't know whether they are or are not. But that is also a conceivably possible thing that we cannot control. And we have no legal obligation to control the activities of Americans of this character.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when we first put forward the Arctic inspection plan in London, it was linked with an alternative, a suggestion, that we would open up the whole of the United States in exchange for the whole of the Soviet Union for inspection. It was also linked with a suggestion for a smaller—in fact, several alternatives—smaller inspection areas in Europe. Do we still stand on those proposals?*

A. Yes, we do.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with your remarks on Indonesia there, that we have no legal obligation to control Americans who might be engaged in this, is this the substance of your answer to Prime Minister Djuanda? He asked that the United States make every move possible to order its citizens out of that area, to tell them to stop assisting this rebellion. Has there been a reply to that, and would this be the substance of it?*

A. We have made no reply as yet. As a matter of fact, I have not seen the full text of the conversation that took place between the Foreign Minister and our Ambassador yesterday, which, I think, shortly followed the public statement that was made by the Prime Minister. We will give very serious consideration to any proposals that were made to us by the Indonesian Foreign Minister. As the President said yesterday, it is our purpose to conduct ourselves in this affair in the most correct way possible.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how does this Government view the proposal of the Tangier meeting for the establishment of an Algerian government-in-exile, so-called, and how much do you assess—how much will the coming NATO meeting in Copenhagen, in your assessment, be involved in the North African question?*

A. I doubt if we will get involved in it at all, for the same reason which leads me not to want to get involved in it here, and that is that there is at the present time no French Government. Efforts are being made to form a French Government, and I think it would be undesirable to ruffle the waters, by mischance, at a time when there is no French Government. I do not know who will represent France at the meeting or whether the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Pineau, will be there or not. It is quite possible he will not be there. But I understand, in any event, if he is there, he will not feel in a position to participate in any discussion of the Algerian matter.

*Q. I asked the question regarding Tangier, Mr. Secretary, because yesterday there were a lot of speculative reports to the effect that this Government wouldn't look with disfavor on the establishment of some kind of Algerian government-in-exile. Were those speculative reports completely wrong?*

A. I would not attach credence to that speculation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of Mr. Hammaraskjold's statement to the Security Council on Tuesday, does the United States Government still consider the Soviet suspension of nuclear tests as a propaganda gimmick?*

A. It was certainly handled in that way. And I don't think one can tell what, if any, sincerity was back of it until we see what happens, if indeed we can see what happens.

One of the aspects of the statement was that it involved no inspection and, secondly, that it reserved the right to resume testing if and when the United States or the United Kingdom test. We are going to be testing right away, so whether there is anything in there beyond propaganda we do not know at the present time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been represented in some press reports recently as being on the opposite side of the question from Admiral Strauss\* on the nuclear test halt issue. Can you tell us whether or not there is any accuracy in those reports, and could you outline some of your thinking on the advisability of halting nuclear tests from a foreign-policy point of view?*

\*Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

A. I think I should not do that for this reason: There are many angles to this question of the suspension of testing. There is a judgment of the relative technical positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is a military judgment, you might say, as to whether, given our different postures and the fact that they presumably will use their weapons only for an attack whereas we would need them for defensive purposes, whether any technical discrepancy in our favor is adequate and adequately takes account of the different needs of our two countries. There is the question of what future testing might be expected to produce and how valuable it is. There is a question of our international relations, the question of the attitude of the United Kingdom and other countries who are interested in this field and may desire themselves to be more qualified nuclear powers, the question of public relations with many other countries.

Now, we all of us in Government—Admiral Strauss, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Killian,<sup>10</sup> myself—we each contribute from our own field of interest and concern to the estimating of this problem, which is then decided by the President. He has not yet taken any decision. Any point of view of mine would be reflective of only part of the problem, and I recognize quite well that there are other aspects of the problem with which I am not independently familiar. So I would think it unwise to present here just one aspect of the problem before the matter has been considered by the President.

#### NATO Council Meeting

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect to accomplish at the NATO meeting which you will attend beginning, I think, on Monday?*

A. These spring meetings of the NATO Council attended by the foreign ministers are usually meetings which are designed primarily to have an exchange of views about the general international situation, particularly relations between East and West as it affects the NATO area. They do not generally deal with specific problems or reach specific decisions. But by bringing about an exchange of views and a common understand-

<sup>10</sup>James R. Killian, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.



ing of the basic elements of the problem, it makes it more likely that the actions of the particular countries will be in harmony with each other. That is the main purpose that will be served here.

Now it may be that because of the pendency of the question of whether or not to have a summit conference and the nature of the talks going on at Moscow and the studies being conducted under the auspices of NATO, as against the possibility that there may be a summit conference, it may be that that will come up for particular consideration at this time. But basically it is to have an exchange of views between the different foreign ministers to be sure that we see the general situation alike or, if initially we don't see it alike, to try and iron out our differences so that the action which we take will be taken from a common premise.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said, in answer to an earlier question, that you would not attach any credence to speculation that we would not look with disfavor on the formation of an Algerian government-in-exile. Does that mean, sir, that we would be opposed to such, to the formation of such a government, or that we just believe it's none of our business at this stage?*

A. This meeting, as I recall—wasn't that the Tangier meeting to which the question was asked?

*Q. Yes.*

A. That was a meeting of parties and not of governments, and we have not given any particular consideration to the conclusions that were arrived at.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have we received any responses from the nations which we invited to send scientists to the Pacific tests, and, if not, what kind of response do we expect to receive from the Soviet-bloc nations?*

A. We have not received any responses from any of the nations involved. As I understand it, we communicated our invitation to the Secretary-General, who in turn transmitted it to the nations that were members of this scientific body. None

of them have made a response as yet. I recall, I think, that there were some remarks made in Moscow which indicated that there was doubt as to Soviet acceptance of the invitation. But I know no more about that than you do who have read those press reports.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of the importance that you have attached to making a first step on inspection of the Arctic, would it be an undue risk in your judgment to offer a temporary suspension of SAC bomber flights into the Arctic, pending negotiations on this question?*

A. I would not want to answer that here because I would be encroaching into a field which is primarily that of the military and where I do not know what the reasons are or whether they would think that it was undue risk or not. I just think that is out of my proper area.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary of the Interior presented to the Senate the other day a plan for stabilization of minerals in this country, which has been received with some encouragement in countries which produce similar minerals, but they are not sure that it means that we are to embark on a no-tariff policy. Could you explain something of that plan to us, please?*

A. I think that the purpose was pretty adequately explained by Secretary Seaton when he made his statement to the congressional committee that he was before. I think he indicated there that it was our hope and expectation that such a program would avoid any new tariffs or quotas upon the minerals in question and that, indeed, the plan for subsidy was an alternative to that and there would not be both of them.

There is some duty, I think, on copper, which is more or less automatic, which comes back on the 30th of June. I don't really know just what the position on that is. But I think that, as far as any new duties are concerned or new quotas, this plan is intended to be an alternative and that both reliefs would not be available.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*



## President Urges U.S.S.R. To Support U.S. Proposal for an International Inspection System in Arctic

*Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.*

### THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

White House press release dated April 28

APRIL 28, 1958

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your communication of April twenty-second in reply to mine of April eighth.<sup>1</sup> I regret that it is not an affirmative response to my proposal.

You refer in your letter to the question raised recently by the Soviet Union in the United Nations Security Council which also touches upon the disarmament question.<sup>2</sup> I am sure that you would agree that with the growing capabilities in the Soviet Union and the United States of massive surprise attack it is necessary to establish measures to allay fears. The United States has just asked the Security Council to reconvene in order to consider the establishment of an international inspection system for the Arctic zone.<sup>3</sup> The United States has submitted a constructive proposal to this end. I urge you to join with us in supporting the resolution of the United States now before the Council. Your support of this proposal and subsequent cooperation would help to achieve a significant first step. It would help to reduce tensions, it would contribute to an increase of confidence among states, and help to reduce the mutual fears of surprise attack.

The United States is determined that we will ultimately reach an agreement on disarmament.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1958, p. 679.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 12, 1958, p. 760.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 816.

In my letter of April eighth, I again proposed an internationally supervised cutoff of the use of new fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the reduction of existing weapons stocks by transfer to peaceful purposes; an agreed limitation or suspension of testing; "open skies", and the international use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

As an effective means of moving toward ultimate agreement on these matters and other disarmament matters, I proposed that we start our technical people to work immediately upon the practical problems involved. These studies were called for by the United Nations General Assembly. They would include the practical problems of supervision and control which, you and I agree, are in any event indispensable to dependable disarmament agreements.

The solution of these practical problems will take time. I am unhappy that valuable time is now being wasted.

You say that we must first reach a final political agreement before it is worthwhile even to initiate the technical studies. But such studies would, in fact, facilitate the reaching of the final agreement you state you desire.

For example, why could not designated technical people agree on what would be required so that you would know if we violated an agreement to suspend testing and we would know if you should commit a violation?

Would not both sides be in a better position to reach agreements if we had a common accepted understanding as to feasibility of detection or as to method of inspecting against surprise attack?

Studies of this kind are the necessary preliminaries to putting political decisions actually into effect. The completion of such technical studies in advance of a political agreement would obviate a considerable period of delay and uncertainty. In other words, with the practicalities already

worked out, the political agreement could begin to operate very shortly after it was signed and ratified.

I re-emphasize that these studies are without prejudice to our respective positions on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, my offer to you still and always will remain open. I hope you will reconsider and accept it. In that way we both can make an important contribution to the cause of just and lasting peace.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of April 8, containing a reply to my message to you in which, on behalf of the Soviet Government, I called upon the Government of the United States of America to join in the decision of the Soviet Union to terminate the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Why did the Soviet Union make this decision?

First, because we deem it necessary to terminate at long last a situation where as a result of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests the health and life of human beings are subjected to a constant and ever-increasing danger even in peacetime.

Secondly, for the purpose of putting an end to the production of ever more terrible means of destruction, since the production of new and even more destructive types of weapons in itself increases the threat of atomic war.

Thirdly, because we regard a cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons by states as the first practical step which is not only fully practicable at the present time but would also make it possible to break the deadlock in which the problem of disarmament now finds itself.

More than enough has already been said concerning the desirability of disarmament. Concrete deeds are what is needed now. A cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons by all states possessing such weapons would be such a concrete deed. Such a measure would be appropriate for the beginning, if only for the reason that its execution would not prejudice the defense interests of any of the powers possessing nuclear weapons—the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, or the United Kingdom—and would, on the contrary, greatly strengthen the feeling of security of all nations.

Finally, it is our deep conviction that the realization of such a step would mark the beginning of a real change in all international relations, a change in their development in the direction of creating a feeling of trust among nations, which is so necessary for the solution of other international problems and for strengthening peace.

The initiative of the Soviet Union has created a situation where the solution of the question concerning a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests depends entirely on the governments of two powers, of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom, since, aside from the Soviet Union, only these powers possess such weapons at the present time. It is for this very reason that we address you and Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, with an appeal to support this initiative of the Soviet Union and also to terminate nuclear weapons tests.

Your negative reply to my message has caused profound disappointment among us. I shall not speak of the tone of the message or of the inclusion in it of a number of assertions in which the position of the U.S.S.R. on the problem of disarmament is knowingly distorted.

The main point is that in your reply we have found no statement concerning the willingness of the United States of America to follow the example of the Soviet Union and to terminate, in its turn, the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons.

Moreover, in your message an attempt is made to cast doubt on the sincerity of the step taken by the Soviet Union. To be frank, I became perplexed when I learned that in a statement at your press conference of April 2 you evaluated the decision of the supreme organ of the Soviet state as a "propaganda gesture." How can an act aimed at erecting the first barrier against the nuclear armaments race and at protecting the life and health of mankind from the danger of atomic radiation be called propaganda?

In your message you deemed it necessary to state that the Soviet Union had adopted this decision after having conducted tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. But is it not a fact that the United States of America has conducted a considerably greater number of tests of nuclear weapons than has the Soviet Union? Did not the United States of America have the opportunity after any of these tests to display initiative in the matter of terminating further tests? I can assure you, Mr. President, that if the United States had been the first to take such a step, we would have welcomed it sincerely.

It is well known that negotiations among states on the question of terminating nuclear weapons tests have not yet resulted in any agreement. But does this mean that we must resign ourselves to the present situation and undertake no steps to achieve a solution of this problem? Of course not. Peoples demand of us practical steps, and it is the duty of statesmen to do everything in their power to bring about a realization of the aspirations of peoples.

In such an important matter as the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests someone had to take the first step. We have taken that step, and we are waiting for the Government of the United States of America to follow our example. If we proceed on the principle of strengthening peace and preventing the threat of nuclear war, it should be stated directly that there are no reasons which would prevent the Government of the United States of America from taking such a step.

Indeed, can a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests by the United States, following a similar

step by the Soviet Union, really prejudice in any way the interests of security or the prestige of the United States? Unquestionably, it cannot. If the point is that the United States needs tests to perfect atomic and hydrogen weapons, then, since the United States has already conducted a considerably greater number of these tests than has the Soviet Union, it follows that in this respect also the United States would lose nothing at all by terminating the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons in a situation where the Soviet Union has already ceased such tests.

With the testing of atomic weapons terminated, all parties would find themselves in an equal position, from the standpoint of their security interests. One could object to terminating nuclear weapons tests in the event, for instance, that one of the parties would like to obtain military or strategic advantages over the other party. However, I believe that you, Mr. President, agree that none of the parties should strive toward such an objective.

As to the matter of prestige, I believe that you will agree with me that a power acting in the interest of strengthening peace will never impair its prestige. On the contrary, peoples will only be grateful to any state if it undertakes actions directed toward strengthening peace. It is never too late for good deeds.

In your reply you speak of the possibility of conducting certain types of tests in secrecy, thereby giving us to understand that it will be impossible to verify the suspension of tests and that deception is possible here. We cannot agree with this appraisal, for in reality the situation is quite different. It is a known fact that at the present time there do exist such apparatus, such instruments, and such methods of detection as to make it possible to record any explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons, wherever they may be detonated. You have even spoken of this yourself. Thus, no state can violate its commitment to cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons without other states becoming apprised of this violation.

It should be added to the foregoing that the Soviet Government not only does not object to the establishment of a system of control over the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests but has even introduced its own specific proposals in this regard. Unfortunately, the Western Powers have not accepted the proposal of the Soviet Union, and it has not yet been possible to reach an agreement on the matter of control over the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

There is no need for me to put particular emphasis here on the enormous moral and political responsibility which would be assumed by states declaring a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Is it conceivable that in time some state might violate the obligations assumed, knowing beforehand that it would thus expose itself in the eyes of nations?

You also say that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests must be part of a broad agreement on disarmament. It is entirely impossible to agree with this statement, considering the many years of experience of essentially fruitless negotiations on problems of disarmament. Authoritative scientists are already giving

warnings concerning the dangerous consequences of radioactive fallout for the health of people throughout the entire globe.

What then, Mr. President, awaits us in the future, if along with conversations about disarmament the testing of ever more powerful means of destruction continues? Is it not obvious that the baneful character of radioactive particles which fall out in nuclear weapons tests will not be diminished at all by the fact that the conducting of these or other tests will be announced in advance and that representatives of various countries will be present at these tests?

Only one thing can put an end to the increasing threat to the health of human beings, and that is the cessation of tests of any kind of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Such a decision by three powers in possession of these weapons would be, at the same time, a great practical contribution to the cause of lessening international tension and strengthening trust and confidence in relations between states. There is no doubt that if the U.S.A. and Great Britain would follow the example of the Soviet Union and cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, this would also undoubtedly contribute to the settlement of other unsolved international problems, including that of disarmament.

These are my observations on the matter of ceasing the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

In your message, Mr. President, you recall, as if to counterbalance the proposal of the U.S.S.R. to cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, your previous proposals regarding "open skies," the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

In this connection I should like to state that the position of the Soviet Union on all these questions is well known.

We have already stated repeatedly, and we do so again, that the flights of aircraft of one country over the territory of another, provided for by the "open sky" plan, would contribute nothing to the solution of the problem of disarmament.

The peoples of our countries will hardly feel more secure or acquire peace and tranquillity from the fact that American aircraft will be flying over our country from one end to the other and that Soviet aircraft will be plowing through American skies under circumstances where attitudes of tension and mistrust prevail. Is it not more correct to assume the opposite?

Under conditions where all our proposals to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons or at least to renounce their use are categorically rejected, where preparation is being made for atomic warfare, as is proven by decisions of the December session of NATO and by the continuing, intensive construction of newer and newer military bases which, according to the candid admission of certain political and military figures of the U.S.A. and other countries belonging to NATO, are designed for inflicting an "atomic blow" against the Soviet Union—under these conditions aerial photography might increase international tension and suspicion among nations. This would not only fail to contribute to the liquidation of the "cold war" and

the establishment of friendly relations among states but would play into the hands of forces which are attempting to find a pretext to engulf humanity in a destructive atomic war.

In this connection I should like to state that the Soviet Union could not fail to note the report that the military command of the U.S.A. has already repeatedly sent aircraft of the Strategic Air Command with a hydrogen bomb load in the direction of the U.S.S.R. According to these reports, the orders for the flight of the aircraft were issued in connection with reports from American radar stations to the effect that Soviet guided missiles were allegedly approaching the territory of the U.S.A. Of course, no Soviet missiles have threatened or do threaten the U.S.A., and the American radar stations' signals were in error, as was to be expected.

There is no special need for me to speak of what a serious danger to the cause of peace is represented by such flights of American aircraft with a hydrogen bomb load toward the borders of the Soviet Union. Is it not clear that in such a situation a simple error in transmitting signals may cause a world catastrophe?

Imagine for a minute, Mr. President, what would happen if the Soviet command, acting in a manner similar to that in which the American military command is now acting, should send aircraft with an atomic and hydrogen bomb load in the direction of the U.S.A., citing the fact that radar stations are sending signals of the approach of American military aircraft, or if the Soviet military command, in reply to the provocative flights of American aircraft, should in its turn decide to send Soviet military aircraft with a hydrogen bomb load in the direction of the United States of America. And yet such flights of Soviet aircraft under these conditions would be absolutely justified.

It suffices to present the problem in this manner to make it clear how dangerous such actions of the American command are. You may say that I am too sharp in my description when I speak of these irresponsible and provocative actions of the American military command. However, I speak of this in this way only because I am compelled to do so by my alarm when I think that, in the atmosphere of the military psychosis which is so characteristic of certain circles in your country, a world tragedy, with millions and millions of human victims, could develop, unexpected by any of us.

We expect from the Government of the United States that it will put an immediate end to this dangerous playing with fire.

Furthermore, I should like to touch upon the matter of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

In the course of the exchange of views in connection with the preparations for convening a summit conference, you proposed that the question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes be discussed at that meeting. We seriously considered this proposal of yours, and we stated that we were prepared to consider at a summit meeting the question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes and the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories. In this connection we proceed from the premise

that any solution of this problem must take into account the security of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and other countries. The proposal of the Soviet government for the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes, the liquidation of bases in foreign territories, and international cooperation in the field of the study of outer space meets this objective. We are prepared to conclude an agreement which would provide for the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes and would permit the launching of rockets into outer space only in accordance with an agreed international program of scientific research. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that atomic and hydrogen weapons can be delivered to the target not only by means of intercontinental rockets but also by means of intermediate and short-range rockets, as well as by means of conventional bombers stationed at the numerous American military bases located in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union.

Your proposal for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes provides, in fact, for the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles alone, leaving aside the other important aspects of this problem. It is easy to see that you propose such a solution of the question as would correspond to the interests of the security of the United States alone, but would not provide any measures that would remove the threat to the security of the Soviet Union or to that of many other states created by the existence of numerous American military bases in foreign territories. The essence of your proposal is to prevent, through the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles, a nuclear counterblow through outer space from being delivered against yourselves. Of course, it is impossible to agree to such an inequitable solution, which would put one side in a privileged position with regard to the other. Therefore we stated that an agreement on the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes must also provide for the liquidation of military bases located in foreign territories, and primarily in Europe, in the Near and Middle East, and in North Africa.

Such a solution of the problem, in our opinion, is equitable because it fully meets the interests of security of the United States, of the Soviet Union, and of other countries, and offers no advantage to any of them. As for the states on the territories of which American military bases are located, it may be said with assurance that they would only profit from such a solution of the problem, in as much as a liquidation of bases would fully meet the interests of the national security of these states by averting the deadly peril which could threaten their populations in case of war.

In your message, Mr. President, you pass over our proposal in complete silence and state that you await the acceptance of your proposal by the Soviet Government. An impression is created that it is desired to impose upon us a solution of the problem of the use of outer space such as would correspond to the interests of the United States alone and would completely ignore the interests of the Soviet Union. Such a one-sided approach is absolutely inadmissible in negotiations between



independent states and, of course, cannot lead to the achievement of an agreement.

In your letter, Mr. President, in touching upon the question of the peaceful use of atomic energy, you attempt to present the matter in such a way as to create the impression that the United States of America is the champion of the peaceful use of atomic energy. However, the actual facts do not bear this out. Indeed, on the basis of facts, one cannot fail to recognize that the Soviet Union is a resolute advocate of the idea that atomic energy must not serve the purpose of exterminating human beings but should rather be fully directed toward serving the peaceful needs of humanity. Since the early days of this problem the Soviet Government has consistently striven in the United Nations for a prohibition of the use of all kinds of atomic and hydrogen weapons, for the elimination of these arms from the armaments of states, for the destruction of the stockpiles thereof, and for the discontinuance of the manufacture of such weapons and the establishment of international control over the execution of these measures.

What has prevented the acceptance of this proposal, the aim of which was to lay a foundation for the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes? As is well known, the United States, together with its Western allies, also since the early days of this problem, has objected to these proposals and has prevented their acceptance, continuing to build its foreign policy on the use of nuclear arms. Thus, a deep abyss has appeared between the words of the United States about its desire to direct its atomic energy toward peaceful purposes, and its deeds.

It is understandable that the Soviet Union, which considers it its sacred duty to rescue mankind from the threat of a destructive atomic war, could not and cannot agree to such proposals, which would lead away from the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and would play into the hands of those forces which strive to have the threat of atomic war constantly hang over mankind like the sword of Damocles.

Unfortunately, your letter of April 8 also contains no proposals directed toward the solution of the problem of disarmament and removal of the threat of nuclear war. Instead of that you proposed that we engage in a study of the question concerning the necessary measures of control by appointing appropriate experts for this purpose. But is it possible for technical experts to contribute anything to the solution of the problem of disarmament if no agreement between Governments has been reached on this point? During the thirteen years of negotiations on disarmament hundreds of speeches were delivered and mountains of paper were written on the subject of control, but this did not bring us one step closer to the solution of the problem of disarmament. It is impossible to permit the solution of

the problem of disarmament itself to be endlessly delayed under the pretext of studying the problems of control.

The Soviet Union has not only never objected to control but also repeatedly introduced proposals itself concerning the establishment of a reliable system of control over the execution of specific measures for disarmament. However, the refusal of the Western Powers to take any practical disarmament steps made the problem of control aimless, because it is of course, impossible to control the execution by states of commitments which do not exist.

The present international situation demands of all states—and, above all, of the great powers, which bear the main responsibility for the destinies of the world—not general phrases about the desirability of disarmament but concrete action in this field.

The Soviet Union has made its contribution to the cause of lessening international tension, to the cause of peace. From now on not a single atomic bomb nor a single hydrogen bomb will be exploded by the Soviet Union unless the United States and United Kingdom compel us to do so. We address the Governments of the United States and Great Britain with the appeal: do not commence a chain reaction of experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs.

The solution of the problem of whether an end will be put to nuclear tests forever or whether these tests will continue poisoning the air and increasing the threat of the outbreak of a destructive atomic war now depends on two powers only, the United States of America and Great Britain, and the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom bear a great responsibility before the entire world.

Perhaps, Mr. President, you do not share all the considerations presented by me, but I should still like to express a desire: would it not be possible to put an end to polemics on this subject, close the book on the past, and agree that the United States of America and Great Britain will discontinue atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, just as the Soviet Union has done?

I assure you that humanity would breathe a deep sigh of relief if all three powers which manufacture atomic and hydrogen weapons would stop the tests of such weapons.

It is our profound hope, Mr. President, that you will use all your authority and influence for these noble aims.

With sincere respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW, April 22, 1958

[Initialed:] MM

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D.C.



## **U.S. Recommends Arctic Zone of Inspection Against Surprise Attack; U.S.S.R. Casts 83d Veto**

*The U.N. Security Council met on April 29 and May 2 to consider a draft resolution submitted by the United States recommending establishment of a "zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic Circle . . ." and a draft resolution submitted by the U.S.S.R. calling upon the United States "to refrain from sending its military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs towards the frontiers of other States for the purpose of creating a threat to their security or staging military demonstrations." Following are the texts of three statements made at these sessions by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge.*

### **OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, APRIL 29**

U.S./U.N. press release 2918 dated April 29

I begin my presentation to the Security Council this morning by referring to the letter which President Eisenhower sent to Chairman Khrushchev yesterday.<sup>1</sup> In that letter he stated:

The United States has just asked the Security Council to reconvene in order to consider the establishment of an international inspection system for the Arctic zone. The United States has submitted a constructive proposal to this end. I urge you to join with us in supporting the resolution of the United States now before the Council. Your support of this proposal and subsequent cooperation would help to achieve a significant first step. It would help to reduce tensions, it would contribute to an increase of confidence among states, and help to reduce the mutual fears of surprise attack.

The United States has asked the Security Council to meet today to take a step which we believe can, in all truth, swiftly and significantly lessen the danger to world peace.

Last week the Security Council met to consider the complaint of the Soviet Union that flights by the United States military aircraft made in the direction of the Soviet frontiers constituted a threat to the security of nations.<sup>2</sup> We believe the Council's discussions were useful in that they

demonstrated beyond question that the Soviet charges were groundless. We showed that the activities of United States military aircraft represent purely defensive measures which are altogether reasonable and necessary in view of the conditions with which they must cope.

Our flights are a necessary defensive measure against massive surprise attack, and it follows therefore that, if the danger of such attack were removed, the need for this defense would be correspondingly lessened. The United States and many other independent nations have been concerned for a long time about the possibility of such an attack. We must continue to be concerned until a workable solution is found. Despite the strictures made against the United States by the Soviet Union last week, Soviet emphasis upon this problem leads us to hope that the Soviet Union may this week be prepared constructively to join hands with the rest of us.

The awesome destructive power of modern armaments makes it at least theoretically possible to wipe out the military capacity of a state—even one of the greatest powers—in a single attack. But such an attack must come without warning if it is to succeed. If there is a way to guard against such massive surprise attack or to allay fear of such an attack—and the United States believes that there is—we here must leave no stone unturned in our effort to find it. In re-

<sup>1</sup> See p. 811.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 12, 1958, p. 760

convening the Security Council today on the item submitted by the Soviet Union, the United States hopes to find such a way.

Finding means to guard against surprise attack can have an important bearing on the prospect for future progress on the lowering of tensions and the continued maintenance of international peace. If each country knew for certain that there was no possibility of a surprise attack being launched against it, the fear of war would decrease and we could move forward toward important disarmament measures. The time is long overdue for such a beginning.

The United States believes that, given good faith and willingness to engage in purposeful negotiations, the time has come to agree to international inspection to remove the fear of surprise attack in the vital Arctic region. Assuming that the Soviet Union meant what it said last week concerning its fears of surprise attack and knowing that other countries do truly fear the prospect of such an attack, we must try to eliminate this danger. We seek a measure which would give us a start toward making great surprise attack virtually impossible, which consequently would reduce the scale of military activity and which could ease the way to significant arms reduction. We propose going ahead with this proposal for an inspection zone in the Arctic without awaiting agreement on disarmament as a whole. This is entirely consistent with the original "open skies" proposal made by President Eisenhower in Geneva in 1955, which we have always been ready to accept as an independent measure. Our present proposal in no way diminishes our belief that discussions should be renewed urgently on the general question of disarmament.

During the Council's discussion last week, various representatives referred to the need to deal with the problem of surprise attack. The Canadian representative reaffirmed his Government's willingness to cooperate in measures of inspection and control involving Canadian territory. He emphasized that it was open to the Soviet Union "to bring about an improvement in the international situation . . . by concerning itself with cooperation in the Arctic region on a system of control and inspection." The representative of Japan urged the states concerned to make a serious effort to resume disarmament negotiations, along with "ways and means to prevent surprise attack."

In a statement of the Soviet Foreign Minister, which was circulated as document S/3991 at the request of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Gromyko made reference to the possibility of a flight of United States aircraft approaching the frontiers of the Soviet Union, in which case, Mr. Gromyko says, "the need to ensure the safety of the Soviet people would require the U.S.S.R. to take immediate measures to remove the approaching threat." Now, although we have made it wholly clear that the United States will not attack any country, yet, if Mr. Gromyko's statement represents a sincere concern—no matter how groundless—surely the Soviet Union will agree that the establishment of an acceptable system of inspection would be desirable. Let us attack the cause of the Soviet concerns, not their symptoms. Surely this is what Soviet Premier Khrushchev had in mind when he said last November: "Our belief and our position is today that conditions should be created that would preclude the possibility of a surprise attack by some countries against others." The United States believes that what is now needed is the will to take constructive action.

Geography makes it apparent that inspection in the Arctic area can be at least the first line of approach to the problem of surprise attack. We are loath to believe that the Soviet Government really wants to deny to its people the kind of safeguards which would make surprise attack virtually impossible. We trust that Mr. Sobolev favored providing such safeguards when he referred to the Soviet Union's wish "to promote an improvement in the international situation and to establish the necessary trust among States" and when he stated that the Council should take "steps designed to reduce the threat of war."

#### **Background of U.S. Proposals**

Now, gentlemen, let me review briefly some of the background of the proposals we are making today.

In July 1955, at the Geneva summit meeting, President Eisenhower introduced a proposal which called for "open skies" inspection over the United States and the U.S.S.R. and a mutual exchange of blueprints between the two countries.<sup>3</sup> At that time he said:

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting and, when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.

This he envisaged as a practical step which would reduce the danger of surprise attack, reduce tension, and thus create an atmosphere which could lead to further progress. Also at the Geneva conference, former Soviet Premier Bulganin reaffirmed an earlier Soviet proposal for a system of ground control posts. We recognized this as a sound measure at the time, and President Eisenhower, on October 11, 1955, wrote to Mr. Bulganin:<sup>4</sup>

I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing inspection teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that too.

Since the President's Geneva proposal, the United States, along with other countries, has continued to emphasize the importance of aerial and ground inspection.

In Secretary Dulles' words of May 29, 1957,<sup>5</sup> we were "trying to get something started quickly; and as far as we are concerned, we will take any area which is sufficiently free of political complications so that the whole process does not get bogged down." To this end the United States suggested that we make a beginning in the Arctic region, where Soviet and American territory significantly adjoins.

No action was taken at that time. Then came the Soviet agenda item of last week. Clearly it gave new significance to this earlier Arctic zone proposal. After careful consideration we concluded that this proposal was applicable to present circumstances.

Let me make clear that this United States proposal is made entirely apart from the general topic of disarmament. The United States is not now attempting to bring the subject of disarmament before the Security Council. There is before the Security Council an alleged "threat to the peace." We want to dispel any possibility of fear that the peace will be disturbed even accidentally.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

<sup>5</sup> For the transcript of Secretary Dulles' news conference of May 29, 1957, see *ibid.*, June 17, 1957, p. 961.

The United States has never considered that inspection against surprise attack was in itself "disarmament." The President put forward his "open skies" proposal as a prelude to disarmament, as something that might make disarmament easier. But it was never a part of disarmament, and we do not now put forward this proposal as an entering wedge to bring the disarmament proposal before the Security Council, although we do recognize that, under article 26 of the charter, the Security Council does have responsibility for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. However, that is not now being brought before the Council.

#### Provisions of U.S. Resolution

Now let me talk about the provisions of the resolution which the United States has introduced.

It looks toward an agreement establishing mutually acceptable safeguards against surprise attack in an important area.

It recommends prompt establishment of a northern zone of inspection against surprise attack.

It calls upon five countries, which engaged in lengthy negotiations on this problem last year, together with Denmark and Norway, both of whom have also concurred concerning their territories, to designate representatives to participate in immediate discussions "with a view to agreeing on the technical arrangements required." This proposal would also apply to any other states having territory north of the Arctic Circle which desire to have such territory included in the inspection zone.

The zone open to inspection would include all territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (that is, Alaska), Denmark (that is, Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees west longitude, east of 160 degrees east longitude, and north of 50 degrees north latitude; all the remainder of the Kamchatka Peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands. This proposed inspection zone encompasses a principal area over which the bulk of any attack might pass. We believe that this vital region should be brought under international inspection.

The United States is openminded about the technical arrangements for such an international

inspection system. This is a matter to be worked out during the course of discussions among the participating states. That is why we have proposed that technical discussions on this matter begin as soon as possible.

Let me emphasize several important considerations regarding an inspection system in the Arctic zone: It should be an agreed international system and not just a national system; any such system should include some means of advance notification of flights and any other movements of military significance in the Arctic zone; there should be radar monitoring of all such flights; and the concept of ground inspection posts, as suggested by the Soviet Union, should be included.

In order to make possible the inclusion of several additional segments of territory within the Arctic Circle which are not specifically covered, we have provided in this resolution for the participation in our discussions of such other states as have territory within this area and desire its inclusion in the zone of inspection.

The resolution makes clear that the states concerned must work out the actual inspection system, which means that the final product must be satisfactory to all of them. And this provision protects us all.

The United States believes that mutually acceptable arrangements along these or similar lines can be devised, that our proposal is serious, and that it affords a reasonable basis for a discussion which can lead to an agreement.

If we can proceed gradually and first experiment with limited measures of aerial and ground inspection, it should facilitate the subsequent expansion of inspection. Once this limited inspection system has proved its value and begun to rebuild mutual confidence, any suspicions that ulterior motives underlie proposals for aerial-inspection arrangements should be removed, once and for all.

We urge all members of the Council—and all countries concerned—to join in making this beginning. Let us at least lessen our worry—our mutual worry—over surprise attack. Let us create by our action in this Council today that mutual confidence so essential to progress toward peace. Let us begin the long-sought, long-awaited, and long-hoped-for step which will lead us and other nations of the world to the just and durable peace all mankind seeks.

May 19, 1958

Gentlemen, this session of this Security Council here in New York today could mark the turn in the road for which humanity has been looking. Let us reassure the world by reaching agreement on this important matter. Let us rise to the occasion.

#### STATEMENT ON SWEDISH AMENDMENT, MAY 2

U.S./U.N. press release 2922 dated May 2

The United States accepts the amendment submitted by the representative of Sweden.\* In doing so, I would like to suggest a change to the representative of Sweden. I hope that he would agree that the word "the" before the word "summit" could be changed to the word "a." The paragraph would then read:

*Expresses the view* that such discussions might serve as a useful basis for the deliberations on the disarmament problem at a summit conference on the convening of which talks are in progress.

#### REBUTTAL STATEMENT, MAY 2

U.S./U.N. press release 2924 dated May 2

The Soviet representative has characterized the United States proposal as merely an intelligence-collection scheme. Obviously, this proposal would, if put into effect, collect new information. But what is of utmost importance is that such information would be collected under international auspices as part of an internationally approved system, to which the states concerned would all have to agree. It is precisely this lack of openness and information about intentions and military capabilities that creates the present tensions and fears. As long as we try to keep this secrecy and maintain this secrecy, the present situation will not improve.

The Soviet representative has dwelt on the danger of an accidental outbreak of war and has suggested that this could only occur as a result of an American error. But it is common knowledge, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union has also a long-range air force and it also has nuclear weapons. If the Soviet leaders are, in fact, ap-

\* U.N. doc. S/3998 dated Apr. 29.



## **Draft Resolution on Arctic Inspection Zone<sup>1</sup>**

*The Security Council,*

*Considering further the item of the U.S.S.R. of 18 April 1958,*

*Noting the development, particularly in the Soviet Union and the United States of America, of growing capabilities of massive surprise attack,*

*Believing that the establishment of measures to allay fears of such massive surprise attack would help reduce tensions and would contribute to the increase of confidence among States,*

*Noting the statements of certain members of the Council regarding the particular significance of the Arctic area,*

*Recommends that there be promptly established the Northern zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic Circle with certain exceptions and additions, that was considered by the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee of Canada, France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States during August 1957;*

*Calls upon the five States mentioned, together with Denmark and Norway, and any other States having territory north of the Arctic Circle which desire to have such territory included in the zone of international inspection, at once to designate representatives to participate in immediate discussions with a view to agreeing on the technical arrangements required;*

*Expresses the view that such discussions might serve as a useful basis for the deliberations on the disarmament problem at a summit conference on the convening of which talks are in progress;*

*Decides to keep this matter on its agenda for such further consideration as may be required.*

<sup>1</sup>U.N. doc. S/3995 as amended; 10 members of the Security Council voted in favor of the resolution, but it was defeated by a Soviet veto.

prehensive about an accidental outbreak of war, it is difficult to understand their objection to an arrangement which would so manifestly reduce the likelihood of an outbreak of war. If we could, with the aid of the United Nations and the ingenuity of our scientists, erect a great wall of vigilance in the Arctic wastes, surely many of our apprehensions would be reduced.

Let me add one word of agreement with one of the comments of the Soviet representative. We have never claimed that the disarmament problem can be solved by vote. We agree that

negotiations are needed. We have submitted proposals on all aspects of disarmament. We are ready and anxious to begin discussions of this problem again, either in the United Nations Disarmament Commission or as part of the preparatory discussions looking toward a possible conference of heads of government. But here and now an important start could be made through the discussions which are called for in the pending resolution.

The question has been raised whether the area described in the resolution is subject to negotiation. I said in my statement last Tuesday that we believe our proposal affords a reasonable basis for a discussion which can lead to an agreement. Of course our Geneva "open skies" proposal also remains open. The Arctic is the area which we think should be covered now. As Secretary of State Dulles commented yesterday,<sup>7</sup> we thought of this area as a useful beginning place because it is an area of strategic importance and because it is relatively free from the political complications that exist elsewhere. For these reasons we think this is the area on which to concentrate.

But, Mr. President, I stress this: We are not inflexible. This is shown by the fact that our proposal makes possible the inclusion of other areas within the Arctic, such as those of Sweden and Finland. The point is that, since Soviet concern related specifically to the Arctic region, this seemed to be the logical place to start. But obviously there are more ways than one in which to work this out.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to repeat the thought which I submitted at an earlier meeting of the Council: that an inspection system which would give reassurance about surprise attack might make our flights unnecessary. Secretary Dulles said yesterday that such an inspection system "would, in fact, lead to a considerable modification of our practices."

I say to Mr. Sobolev, if, therefore, you really mean what you say about your objection to American flights, your course is perfectly clear: you have but to vote for the United States resolution.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup>For the transcript of Secretary Dulles' news conference of May 1, 1958, see p. 804.

<sup>8</sup>Following the Soviet veto of the U.S. draft resolution (S/3995 as amended), the Security Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution (S/3997) by a vote of 1 to 9, with 1 abstention (Sweden).



## U.S. Replies to Polish Note on Rapacki Plan

### U.S. NOTE OF MAY 3

Press release 242 dated May 4

*United States Ambassador to Poland Jacob D. Beam delivered on May 3 the U.S. Government's reply to the Rapacki plan proposals elaborated in the memorandum attached to the Polish Government's note of February 14. Ambassador Beam handed the U.S. note to Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz. The text of the U.S. reply is as follows:*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Rapacki's note of February 14, 1958, enclosing a memorandum elaborating on the Polish Government's proposals concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

Recognizing that the initiative of the Polish Government stems from a desire to contribute to the attainment of a stable and durable peace, my Government has given these proposals serious and careful consideration. On the basis of this study it has concluded that they are too limited in scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe. They neither deal with the essential question of the continued production of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers nor take into account the fact that present scientific techniques are not adequate to detect existing nuclear weapons. The proposed plan does not affect the central sources of power capable of launching a nuclear attack, and thus its effectiveness would be dependent on the good intentions of countries outside the area. The proposals overlook the central problems of European security because they provide no method for balanced and equitable limitations of military capabilities and would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany.

An agreement limited to the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the territory indicated by your Government without other types of limitation would, even if it were capable of being inspected, endanger the security of the Western European countries in view of the large and widely deployed military forces of the Soviet Union. Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western

forces in Germany would find themselves under present circumstances at a great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of Western Europe which are, as the Soviet leaders made clear, being equipped with the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds.

The considerations outlined above have caused the United States in association with other Western Powers to propose that nations stop producing material for nuclear weapons, cease testing such weapons and begin to reduce present stockpiles. The United States has further proposed broader areas of inspection against surprise attack, including an area in Europe, roughly from the United Kingdom to the Ural mountains. We remain willing to do this. You will recall, moreover, that the Western nations offered at the London disarmament negotiations to discuss a more limited zone in Europe. With regard to missiles you will recall that over a year and a half ago the United States proposed that we begin to study the inspection and control needed to assure the exclusive peaceful use of outer space now threatened by the development of such devices as intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The United States, in association with other Western Powers, has also proposed that a comprehensive and effective European security arrangement be established in conjunction with the reunification of Germany. The proposed arrangements would provide for limitations on both forces and armaments, measures for the prevention of surprise attack in the area, and assurances of reaction in the event of aggression.

Your note speaks of the existence of opposing military groupings in Central Europe as being responsible for tensions in the area. It should not be necessary for me to recall that the present division of Europe stems primarily from the decision of the Soviet Union not to permit Eastern European nations to participate in the European Recovery Plan. Nor need I repeat the many assurances given as to the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is reflected in its entire organizational and command structure. The entire history of its creation and development testify to this, though persistent efforts are made in some quarters to portray it otherwise.

In the absence of effective arrangements either general or regional in character which would promote real security and in view of the present policies and armaments of the Soviet Union, the countries of Western Europe along with Canada and ourselves, joined in alliance with them, have no other recourse than to develop the required pattern of integrated NATO military strength and to utilize for defensive purposes modern developments in weapons and techniques.

The views which I have presented above on behalf of my Government point out the basic reasons why the United States considers that the Polish Government's proposals for establishing a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would not serve to advance their expressed objectives. Nevertheless, the United States appreciates the initiative of the Polish Government in seeking a solution to these problems. It hopes that this exchange of correspondence will enable the Polish Government better to understand American proposals in the fields of European security and disarmament. I trust that the improved relations between Poland and the United States will serve as a basis for a better understanding between our two countries on these problems, as well as on other matters.

#### **POLISH NOTE OF FEBRUARY 14<sup>1</sup>**

I wish to refer to the conversation which I had on December 9, 1957, with the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the United States in Warsaw. In this conversation I have presented the position of the Polish Government in respect to the tendencies to make the nuclear armaments in Europe universal and particularly towards the acceleration of armaments in Western Germany. The threat of further complications, primarily in Central Europe, where the opposing military groupings come into a direct contact and the apparent danger of an increase in the international tension have prompted the Polish Government to initiate at that time direct discussions through diplomatic channels on the Polish proposal submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957, concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

This proposal has evoked a wide interest in government and political circles as well as in the broad strata of public opinion in many countries.

Taking into account a number of opinions expressed in declarations made in connection with the Polish pro-

posal and with the view to facilitate negotiations, the Polish Government has resolved to present a more detailed elaboration of its proposal. This finds its expression in the attached memorandum which is simultaneously being transmitted by the Polish Government to the governments of France, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as to the governments of other interested countries.

The Polish Government is conscious of the fact that the solution of the problem of disarmament on a world-wide scale requires, first of all, negotiations among the great powers and other countries concerned. Therefore, the Polish Government supports the proposal of the U.S.S.R. government concerning a meeting on the highest level of leading statesmen with the participation of heads of governments. Such a meeting could also result in reaching an agreement on the question of the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, should an agreement among the countries concerned not be reached in the meantime. In any event the initiation at present of discussions on the question of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would contribute to a successful course of the above mentioned meeting.

The Polish Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will study the attached memorandum and that the proposals contained in it will meet with the understanding of the Government of the United States. The Polish Government on its part would be prepared to continue the exchange of views on this problem with the Government of the United States.

#### **MEMORANDUM**

On October 2, 1957, the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations a proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. The governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Republic declared their readiness to accede to that zone.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic proceeded with the conviction that the establishment of the proposed denuclearized zone could lead to an improvement in the international atmosphere and facilitate broader discussions on disarmament as well as the solution of other controversial internal issues, while the continuation of nuclear armaments and making them universal could only lead to a further solidifying of the division of Europe into opposing blocks and to a further complication of this situation, especially in Central Europe.

In December 1957 the Government of the Polish People's Republic renewed its proposal through diplomatic channels.

Considering the wide repercussions which the Polish initiative has evoked and taking into account the propositions emerging from the discussion which has developed on this proposal, the Government of the Polish People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed elaboration of its proposal, which may facilitate the opening of negotiations and reaching of an agreement on this subject.

<sup>1</sup> Handed to Ambassador Beam at Warsaw on Feb. 14 by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki.

I. The proposed zones should include the territory of: Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic. In this territory nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations designed for their servicing would not be located there; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.

II. The contents of the obligations arising from the establishment of the denuclearized zone would be based upon the following premises:

1. The states included in this zone would undertake the obligation not to manufacture, maintain nor import for their own use and not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well as not to install nor to admit to their territories of installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

2. The four powers (France, United States, Great Britain, and U.S.S.R.) would undertake the following obligations:

(A) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their forces stationed on the territories of states included in this zone; neither to maintain nor to install on the territories of these states any installations or equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

(B) Not to transfer in any manner and under any reason whatsoever, nuclear weapons nor installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons—to governments or other organs in this area.

3. The powers which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated in this zone.

Thus the powers would undertake the obligation to respect the status of the zone as an area in which there should be no nuclear weapons and against which nuclear weapons should not be used.

4. Other states, whose forces are stationed on the territory of any state included in the zone, would also undertake the obligation not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such weapons to governments or to other organs in this area. Neither will they install equipment or installations designed for the servicing of nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment, on the territories of states in the zone nor will they transfer them to governments or other organs in this area.

The manner and procedure for the implementation of these obligations could be the subject of detailed mutual stipulations.

III. In order to ensure the effectiveness and implementation of the obligations contained in Part II, paragraphs 1-2 and 4, the states concerned would undertake to create a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its functioning.

1. This system could comprise ground as well as aerial control. Adequate control posts, with rights and possibilities of action which would ensure the effectiveness of inspection, could also be established.

The details and forms of the implementation of control can be agreed upon on the basis of the experience acquired up to the present time in this field, as well as on the basis of proposals submitted by various states in the course of the disarmament negotiations, in the form and to the extent in which they can be adapted to the area of the zone.

The system of control established for the denuclearized zone could provide useful experience for the realization of broader disarmament agreement.

2. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the proposed obligations an adequate control machinery should be established. There could participate in it, for example, representatives appointed/not excluding additional personal appointments/by organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty. Nationals or representatives of states, which do not belong to any military grouping in Europe, could also participate in it.

The procedure of the establishment, operation and reporting of the control organs can be the subject of further mutual stipulations.

IV. The most simple form of embodying the obligations of states included in the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. To avoid, however, implications, which some states might find in such a solution, it can be arranged that:

1. These obligations be embodied in the form of four unilateral declarations, bearing the character of an international obligation deposited with a mutually agreed upon depository state.

2. The obligations of great powers be embodied in the form of a mutual document or unilateral declaration/as mentioned above in paragraph 1/;

3. The obligations of other states, whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the zone, be embodied in the form of unilateral declarations/as mentioned above in paragraph 1/.

On the basis of the above proposals the government of the Polish People's Republic suggests to initiate negotiations for the purpose of a further detailed elaboration of the plan for the establishment of the denuclearized zone, of the documents and guarantees related to it as well as of the means of implementation of the undertaken obligations.

The government of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to the adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the states included in the zone.

## Nationalism in Africa

by Joseph Palmer 2d

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs<sup>1</sup>

The sense of privilege that I feel at the opportunity to speak at this distinguished institution of higher learning is reinforced by my recognition of the importance that the Institute of Ethnic Studies is attaching to the problems attendant upon "Nationalism in Africa," my subject today. This emphasis is perhaps best illustrated by a fact: Within a few short years the Continent of Africa has trebled its participation in the community of nations. In the light of this development I do not need to point out to such an audience as this that the urge to create a national entity and to exercise the prerogatives of self-government is, at least in major portions of the continent, probably the major political, economic, and social force in Africa today. This pervasive inner drive is weaving profound changes in the fabric of African societies and, in its international aspect, has the most direct and fundamental importance for the rest of the world—Europe, first of all, but assuredly also for both Asia and the Americas. Any effort to foresee the character of world society a decade hence must certainly take account, as a primary consideration, of nationalism in Africa.

We cannot expect to find, in our study of Africa, many generalizations that will serve as a common key to full interpretation of the various national dramas which are unfolding on this continent. The geographic sweep is too immense, the contact with different European or Middle Eastern cultures too compartmented and varied, and the basic cultural, ethnic, and politico-economic heritage too diverse to expect too much

from the search for generalizations about Africa as a whole.

With these reservations in mind, however, there are certain observations about Africa as a whole that contribute much to our understanding of the various national movements there. Many of these, it seems to me, originate in the fact that the time span of so much of Africa's self-expression has been compressed into the last 2 decades. Every state in Africa today was deeply affected by, if not actually conceived in, the aftermath of World War II. The sweep of large sections of Asia toward nationalism, the development of the cold war between the Soviet bloc and the Western World, the rise of the United Nations, and a new emphasis on international collaboration in a truly mutual sense, as well as the peculiar economic problems of our era, have obviously left their mark on African nationalism, the more so because it had so few expressions before these developments.

I would like to speak to you today, first, about the way some of these external factors have influenced nationalism in Africa and then about a number of considerations of a more indigenous nature. My remarks will relate primarily to Africa south of the Sahara, where the greatest number of new states are being readied to emerge, but they also have similar application to the North African area in many instances.

In the main the influences of world events in this decade have been salutary ones for an orderly development of African nationalism. The primary reason for this is that those European states which are dedicated to a policy of transferring administrative powers and responsibilities to the new African nations have, by and large, accurately

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Institute of Ethnic Studies at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., on Apr. 25 (press release 222).



read the lessons of the history of our times. They have subordinated their own more narrowly national interests and muffled their instruments of power in recognition of a larger world and regional interest in which progress through cooperation is the keynote. This breadth of vision by the former administering powers need not be attributed only to altruism in order to be commended. Rather, the fact that it reflects a true community of interest indicates that there is a more effective and reliable basis for collaboration in a relationship based on equality than one based on a subordinate status.

### **Trends Toward Beneficial Collaboration**

Even in these favorable circumstances, it is also to their great credit that the leaders and peoples of the new Africa are displaying a comprehension of opportunities which often equals and sometimes even surpasses that of the older states with which they are developing channels of beneficial collaboration. These possibilities, in fact, hold great hope that, in the next decade, African nationalism in general will continue to move in this direction, first because this trend will be consistent with the mainstream of world affairs and secondly because it will become increasingly apparent that a very great potential for the benefit of the inhabitants of that continent can best be realized within the context of such collaboration.

To take this optimistic view is not to ignore the day-to-day problems over which European and African states have their differences. Mankind is not perfect, and the search for a new equilibrium has never been without blind alleys and pitfalls anywhere or any time in human history. But the long series of great wars during the last hundred years has demonstrated convincingly—not least of all to the African peoples—the futility and destructiveness of self-centered nationalism, devoted to autarky, vengeance, and solutions by force. There is, in fact, a basis for the hope that, given continued mature and moderate leaders and understanding by the administering powers, the transition of much of Africa will be so rapid that the new states which emerge may leapfrog the early destructive phase which nationalism has often demonstrated in other regions and fall more naturally into stride with the free world's widespread trend toward a cooperation transcending national borders. Certainly there can be no question as to the desirability of such a trend, and it is inherent in

our policy that we give appropriate encouragement to such mutually beneficial collaboration. At the same time, we must realistically recognize that any initiative for such relationships must come freely and voluntarily from the new states themselves if a firm basis is to be established on which to build.

There are, of course, compelling factors of vital national interest which tie Africa and Europe together. As new African states come to self-government and independence, it is natural and advisable that the benefits inherent in their former relationship with the metropolitan powers be fully explored as a basis for future mutually advantageous collaboration. With and beyond these considerations, it is possible also to envisage a healthy trend toward closer regional ties, sought freely and independently by states having similar interests and recognizing in cooperation of this sort an opportunity to strengthen capacities for true national self-expression.

Ghana's decision to seek membership in the British Commonwealth is a clear-cut example of the first trend. The conference of African states just concluded at Accra is a timely example of the second. One can hardly refrain from contrasting these developments as authoritative expressions of nationalism in Africa with the Soviet relationship with Eastern Europe and with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo last December. You will recall that virtually all African governments refrained from official representation at the latter meeting—a decision which constituted clear recognition that the directors of this conference were obviously preoccupied with ulterior motives. Their use of almost every nationalistic cliché to paint the Soviet bloc in a sanctimonious light and the Western World as the epitome of evil was labored and transparent. Their purpose, of course, had nothing to do in reality with Africa. In fact, it is clear that the Cairo meeting was nothing more than an obvious and abortive effort to foist a non-African initiative and non-African interests on African governments. As such, it was essentially an anti-nationalistic undertaking.

There is every reason to believe that the states of Africa will jealously defend their independence and will not permit its compromise through entanglement with the devious political designs of the Soviet bloc. As many neighboring states

have found, Communist imperialism is a much heavier yoke than even the earlier Western models. Moreover, this Soviet product continues in very active manufacture these days, whereas the Western World is closing out this commodity as obsolete.

Communist influence on African nationalism has, in a positive sense, been comparatively small up to the present time. In one or two isolated cases it has succeeded in a degree of penetration of national movements which will counsel careful attention by dedicated Africans. By and large, however, the African nationalist has been astute to realize the conspiratorial nature of international communism and its incompatibility with true national independence.

Since the efforts of international communism to penetrate have been largely unsuccessful, its agents have sought to spread their influence by less direct means. For example, there are thousands of African students in Western Europe, and the Communists are making a continuing effort to capture their minds and divert their energies from constructive nationalism to the false doctrine of international communism. Practically all of these students are strong nationalists, and, by appearing to support their nationalist aspirations, the Communists often gain a sympathetic hearing. The admirable quality of idealism in African students, in common with students the world over, unfortunately induces some of them to take Communist propaganda at its face value, their experience being as yet inadequate to reveal the reality behind the sham. Here is a challenge to the Western World to recognize in African students in our midst the national leaders of tomorrow and to give them freely of our time and sympathetic attention. Georgetown and other leading American universities deserve high credit for their contribution to this field.

#### **Constructive Role of the United Nations**

There can be no doubt that the United Nations has been an immensely constructive force in the development of responsible nationalism in Africa, both before and after independence. The trust territories, of course, have been most directly affected. Under the terms of the United Nations Charter, each administering power is charged with promoting the advancement of its trust territories toward self-government or independence.

As a result of progress in this respect, the former British Togo opted to join Ghana, Somalia is due to obtain its independence in 1960, and the other trust territories in Africa are evolving rapidly toward the ultimate objectives of the trusteeship system, either as separate entities or in association with neighboring states.

At the same time that the United Nations has provided opportunities for African nationalism to appeal to international conscience, it has also induced a sense of responsibility in holding out the prospect of membership in the community of nations when statehood is realized. Once membership in the United Nations has been obtained, it provides a framework for continued responsibility, as well as security, by relieving, at least to a degree, the moderate leaders of the new state from excessive preoccupation with the danger of external attack and, conversely, enabling them in domestic politics to demonstrate more easily the danger of resorting to national adventure themselves. Nor should we fail to point out that the close observation of Soviet policy and actions which the U.N. forum affords to African governments has, as for example in the case of Hungary, helped vividly to bring home to them the harsh reality which lies behind the façade of Soviet pretensions to support nationalist causes.

In another sense, also, the U.N. Charter will, I feel sure, play a most salutary and necessary role in African affairs, in providing a guide for the peaceful solution—either outside or within the organization—of disputes arising from boundaries which were drawn (and often ill defined) in a different international context. There are few frontiers in Africa which were drawn originally with an adequate knowledge of ethnic, economic, and even geographic considerations. It is not always easy for political leaders to withstand extremist pressures—with their attendant short-term domestic political rewards—to engage in an old-fashioned border dispute or to encourage a dubious irredentism. This is not to say that there may not be cases in which territorial adjustments will be necessary, desirable, and in accordance with the desires and interests of the nations and populations concerned. But the ability to rise above mere chauvinism—of which there have been many heartening demonstrations already—may well be one of the key considerations in assessing the ultimate success of African na-

tionalism in terms of a better life for the African peoples. In this regard, a salutary emphasis on a cooperative regional approach to the exploitation of natural resources lying in frontier or disputed areas may well offer a touchstone by which many of the difficult territorial questions can be reduced to negotiable terms.

In much of Africa south of the Sahara, the concept of a nation has not hitherto existed in the historical experience of the area. The national vision, in fact, often materializes only in the course of, and almost as a means of, acquiring governmental autonomy. In this respect, the movement often has the explicit or implicit blessing of the administering authorities, and in such cases the construction of the nation becomes a cooperative venture of indigenous and external forces. But, however nurtured, the concept of the nation has amazing capacity for taking root and flourishing in this virgin territory. The heroes of the national movement acquire by their successes the stature which enables them to exert an appeal and influence throughout the extent of their territory. There can, in short, be little doubt that the national self-consciousness formed in this fashion, under conditions prevailing in Africa and the rest of the world today, is no less real and viable than nationalisms which have the sanction of long histories.

#### **Rivalries Between Traditionalists and Modernists**

I would like now, with your indulgence, to turn to some considerations about African nationalism which are primarily indigenous in nature.

Even where transition from a colonial to a self-governing or independent status has evolved smoothly and favorably, internal divisions are likely to emerge once the new state is established. Newly formed nations or nascent national movements in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, normally undergo a serious struggle between domestic factions for control of the national destiny. Just as the effort to obtain or to force the pace of concessions from the former colonial power tended to galvanize the national movement into existence, so later does this confrontation serve as a basis of rivalry for popular appeal between nationalist parties. This is one issue that is easy to dramatize. Thus, and not necessarily related to the merits, a former colonial power sometimes

continues as the apparent target of vocal sections of nationalist agitation long after much greater or more serious problems have come to confront the new state. In many cases, however, the responsibilities of government begin to weigh heavily on the party in power, which may become increasingly aware of the importance to the national existence of the continuance of close and mutually beneficial economic and cultural ties with the former metropole. In some cases, the prospect of power even tends to mitigate extremist tendencies by opposition elements. There may thus emerge a moderate and responsible concept of the national interest based on the continuance of close and friendly cooperation with the former administering power.

In these circumstances domestic rivalries revolve around both personalities and issues, but the majority arise over the pace and direction of social change. A major distinction arises between what we might distinguish as traditionalists and modernists. Within each group, moreover, there are usually moderate factions favoring evolutionary tactics opposed to those extremists who would assert more drastic methods.

Traditionalists, who fear loss of position, influence, or prestige in a rapidly changing world, seek to retain or even return to the old social and political systems. At most, they would concede the changes in power distribution which have already taken place, while seeking to preserve as long as possible the remnants of what power still remains to them. In their more extreme form, such traditionalist movements may aspire to revert completely to the social and political patterns which prevailed before the advent of colonial rule.

The modernists, on the other hand, find the traditional institutions inadequate and seek to recast their societies in a Western image. The modernists tend to divide into conservatives and radicals, these terms being used in an African rather than Western context. For example, both groups tend to advocate what they call "socialism," with the conservatives leaning toward state supervision of the economy, while the radicals favor state ownership and operation; both reflect basic African social concepts in their rejection of individualism and acceptance of a considerable degree of authoritarianism in the interest of the community.

Africa's nontraditional conservatives generally retain status in the traditional society at the same time that they accept Western political and eco-

conomic and cultural values as offering the best method to maintain and expand their influence. They tend to dominate the civil service, the professions, and trade, to the extent these activities are open to them. Some hedge their acceptance of modernization with the proviso that it be implemented on a slow and piecemeal basis. At the opposite end of the conservative spectrum are leaders who seek to enlarge the impact of the West as rapidly as possible, in their desire to obtain for their people the scientific enlightenment, the material advantages, and the modern governmental and social structure which they believe essential in their country for fulfillment of the promises and hopes raised by independence.

Africa's minority of radicals is largely composed of young men who have failed to find, in the traditional patterns of African society or in the modifications proposed by the conservatives, outlets commensurate with their skills and ambitions. Consequently, they seek a far-reaching revision of traditional institutions in a manner which is often considerably influenced by the more extreme byways of Marxist socialism. Although there are some African extremists of African Communist persuasion, most of the radical minority in African nationalism tends to reject the leadership of the U.S.S.R.

As we have previously noted, some or all of these various nationalist groups tend to coalesce and submerge their fundamental differences in favor of a common front in the preindependence period. The prevailing outlook of the coalition, especially if a long and bitter struggle is involved, tends to become that of the most dynamic partner. Then, when independence is achieved, this partner may be reluctant to concede to the other factions a share in governmental power. In fact, there is often a tendency to consolidate power at the expense of opposition elements. It is at this point that a danger exists of discarding traditional values and of impugning the motives of other groups who may be equally dedicated and capable of contributing to the national interest and well-being. If these assets are destroyed, what may appear to emerge as a monolithic expression of the national will may be less strong than the system it replaced. At the same time, there are sometimes different shades of opinion built into such monopolistic political movements, with certain elements performing a similar function to that of a "loyal

opposition." On balance, it would appear that the pressure of problems affecting the new African states is such that, without the free and effective mobilization of all responsible sectors of national opinion in the common interest, the ability of the new state to meet the exigencies of history may be placed in jeopardy.

#### **Problems of Tribal Tensions**

Similar considerations apply to the problem of racialism, tribal rivalries, and religious discrimination. It has been pointed out that in British East Africa tribal tensions have been as serious a problem as interracial stresses. In Kenya there is a history of hostility among the tribes which frequently erupted into warfare before the advent of British control. Even more than half a century later, the antagonisms thus generated are far from having disappeared. In Uganda, where the racial problem is negligible, a serious difficulty in the political evolution of the country is the rivalry between the province of the Buganda tribe—large, advanced, and prosperous—and the less highly developed three other provinces. Tanganyika has a somewhat similar (although less acute) problem in the disparities between, for example, the prosperous and advanced Wachagga and the various other African peoples of the Trust Territory.

These ancient tribal antipathies are slowly breaking down under the impact of social and economic progress. Urbanization, in particular, is having its effect. Although about 85 percent of all Africans still live in rural areas, more and more young men every year are leaving farms and villages to join the labor force in the towns and cities, in the mines, and on the great estates. In so doing they often move in one step through a span in development that elsewhere took hundreds of years.

These migrants inevitably feel insecure when faced with the impersonal and competitive life of the industrial world. They have a sense of being torn in two directions: The old ties and traditions draw them back; the material and philosophical rewards of the modern world pull them forward. The forward attraction, in the long run, usually proves to be the stronger.

Where statehood has not been long or firmly established, African nationalism seems to grow in proportion as tribal loyalties and intertribal divi-



sions are weakened. This phenomenon has, in recent years, become apparent even in the heterogeneous East African territories where African nationalism is beginning to cut across intertribal lines. Just as the pull of the city is gradually proving stronger than loyalty to the rural village, so is modern nationalism slowly proving stronger than the traditional tribal divisions. If this unity is to be carried over successfully into the era of independence, magnanimity and tolerance will be required of the African national leader in particularly large measure.

### Interracial Stresses

Racialism in Africa takes many forms, all of them divisive to a regrettable degree but most of them presently under what is remarkable control considering the stresses involved. We may note in this connection not only misunderstanding and friction between Africans and Europeans but also between Asians and Africans, between Arabs and Negroes.

While African nationalism heretofore has been closely concerned with African relationships with Europeans, this problem has, to the great credit of both sides, tended to reduce itself to relative obscurity as independence has become an accomplished fact. In the independent states of North Africa, for example, where the European and Arab populations live side by side, the two communities have within a few short years developed a remarkable capacity for getting along together and adjusting to the new roles brought by independence. In some cases, in fact, this compatibility on the scene has actually exceeded that prevailing between the respective governments. In any event, such experiences represent a hopeful sign for the future of better community relations elsewhere on the continent.

It is often pointed out that relationships between Europeans and Africans have been strained primarily in areas where Europeans have come as permanent settlers in large numbers, generally where the climate and the economic potential have favored European settlement, such as in the Union of South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Kenya. In contrast, racial problems have been relatively minor or temporary in those regions where white settlers are few and where the role of the European has been almost exclusively that of administrator, missionary,

teacher, or technician. Apparently, therefore, it is not contact between Europeans and Africans *per se* which gives rise to the most serious racial problems but an actual or potential economic and social competition between these two permanently established racial groups.

It would be both wrong and futile to draw from these comments any inference that it was an historical error for Europeans to settle permanently on African soil. This would be to dismiss the great benefits which the industry, imagination, and skills of the European settlers have brought to their African neighbors. As a moral judgment, it would ignore the facts that the European settlement occurred largely on land which was not being utilized by the Africans and that the countries involved are, in most cases, the only homes the Europeans know. More importantly, such a conclusion would imply a lack of confidence that men of differing races and colors, living side by side, can work out a common destiny based on ideals of partnership, brotherhood, and justice. This objective is, of course, difficult of realization, and, in the light of our own experience in developing harmonious race relations and balancing precept with practice, it behooves us to approach racial problems elsewhere in the world in all humility. At the same time we must reject the pessimistic premise that racial partnership is an impossible ideal.

Insofar as racial problems are a basic consideration in the development of African nationalism, their solution will undoubtedly assist the ability of the administering authorities to come to harmonious terms with that nationalism. This is proving to be a slow and difficult process in such territories as Kenya and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But we may take encouragement from the fact that the declared policy of the Governments of these territories is one of racial partnership and achievement of a harmonious and mutually beneficial plural society.

### The Course of African Nationalism

Nationalism as a force makes one think of a mighty river, inexorable in its movement to empty into the sea, whether through an even and beneficial flow in an orderly channel or through a sudden floodtide of destructive energy.

Thus far, at least, the course of African nationalism, especially when compared with the

development of other continents, has, in most instances, been a remarkably sound and reasonable one. The African national movements which led their countries to statehood in the post-war period have to a gratifying degree controlled the temptations, usual to their historical position, of chauvinism, blind rejection of constructive external influence, and neglect of economic needs for eye-catching but sterile political maneuvers. The leaders of African states in this decade have, by and large, assured themselves of a distinguished place in their national histories—and in international esteem—by virtue of statesmanlike moderation and ability to plan soundly for their countries' futures. Nor should we for a moment forget that in many cases it has been the far-sighted policies of the metropolitan powers themselves which have given the impetus to this wholesome development. I think it is not too early to conclude that the faith that prompted their decisions has been fully justified.

If future developments are characterized by the same moderation, restraint, and sense of responsibility by both African nationalism and the administering powers, there is every reason to be confident of the future peace, stability, and prosperity of an African continent cooperating voluntarily and fruitfully with the rest of the free world.

## **U.S. Acts To Revoke Egyptian Assets Control Regulations**

Press release 233 dated April 30

The Department of State has been informed of the signature in Rome on April 29 of an agreement covering the terms to be embodied in a final settlement between the United Arab Republic and the Universal Suez Canal Company.

The United States has made clear that the principal reason for the freezing of certain Egyptian and canal company assets in this country has been the uncertain legal situation resulting from the dispute between the Government of Egypt and the company and the risk of double jeopardy to which American users of the Suez Canal might thus be exposed. It has also been indicated that, if an agreement or substantial progress toward an agreement were reached on this matter, thereby

clarifying the legal situation, the United States would expect to release the blocked funds of the United Arab Republic and the Suez Canal Company.

The Rome agreement, which the United States welcomes, is considered to satisfy the above conditions. The Treasury has been informed of the Department's views and has taken action to revoke the Egyptian Assets Control Regulations, effective May 1, 1958.

## **U.S.-Soviet Discussions On Exchange of Films**

Press release 230 dated April 29

The Soviet and U.S. delegations which started meetings at Washington a month ago<sup>1</sup> on the film section of the U.S.S.R.-U.S. cultural affairs agreement<sup>2</sup> have decided to postpone further discussions until a later date. The time and place for the reconvened sessions will be determined through diplomatic channels within 30 days.

The two delegations screened a number of films from each country and feel that a basis has been laid for definite future arrangements to carry out the objectives of the two Governments. Most of the emphasis during the discussions so far has related to the selection, terms, and conditions for the purchase and sale of motion pictures.

The Motion Picture Export Association of America has been acting as the agent of MPEAA member companies to license U.S. films, while Sovexportfilm represents the Soviet film industry. Independent U.S. motion picture companies and their films have also been included in the discussions.

A number of specific understandings were reached:

1. Films are to be licensed in each country for a period of 5 years;
2. Licensing of pictures shall be on a flat-sum, dollar, cash basis;
3. Each side has the right to approve the dubbing and subtitling of the other's pictures.

Tentative views were expressed on other aspects of the film section, but discussions were tem-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1958, p. 552.

<sup>2</sup> For text of agreement, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

porarily put aside until there is definite agreement on the purchase and sale of pictures.

The Soviet delegation consisted of Aleksandr Slavnov, of the Soviet Ministry of Culture; Aleksandr Davydov, director; and Yuri Dobrokhoto, of Sovexportfilm. Mr. Slavnov returned to Moscow on April 26. Messrs. Davydov and Dobrokhoto return April 30.

The U.S. delegation consisted of Eric Johnston, president, Motion Picture Association of America, and Turner B. Shelton, director, Motion Picture Service, U.S. Information Agency.

## Freedom Under Law

*Statement by President Eisenhower*<sup>1</sup>

White House press release dated April 30

Thursday—May first—has by proclamation been designated "Law Day."<sup>2</sup> The reason is to remind us all that we as Americans live, every day of our lives, under a rule of law.

Freedom under law is like the air we breathe. People take it for granted and are unaware of it—until they are deprived of it. What does the rule of law mean to us in everyday life? Let me quote the eloquent words of Burke:

The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms may enter; the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of that ruined tenement!

But the rule of law does more than insure freedom from high-handed action by rulers. It insures justice between man and man—however humble the one and however powerful the other. A man with five dollars in the bank can call to account the corporation with five billion dollars in assets—and the two will be heard as equals before the law. The law, however, has not stopped here. It has moved to meet the needs of the times. True, it is good that the King cannot enter unbidden into the ruined cottage. But it is not good that men should live in ruined cottages.

The law in our times also does its part to build a society in which the homes of workers will be invaded neither by the sovereign's troops nor by

the storms and winds of insecurity and poverty. It does this not by paternalism, welfarism, and handouts but by creating a framework of fair play within which conscientious, hardworking men and women can freely obtain a just return for their efforts.

This return includes not only good wages and working conditions but insurance as a right against the insecurities of injury, unemployment, and old age. In the words of a great American lawyer:

The law must be stable, but it must not stand still.

Another direction in which the rule of law is moving is that of displacing force in relations among sovereign countries. We have an International Court of Justice. We have seen the exercise of an international police function, both in the United Nations force in Korea and in the United Nations force assigned to the Gaza Strip. We have agreements in article 2 of the United Nations Charter to the most fundamental concepts of international conduct.

We have elaborate rules of international law—far more complete and detailed than most people realize. More than once nations have solemnly outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, most recently in the charter of the United Nations. We have, in short, at least the structure and machinery of an international rule of law which could displace the use of force. What we need now is the universal will to accept peaceful settlement of disputes in a framework of law.

As for our own country, we have shown by our actions that we will neither initiate the use of force or tolerate its use by others in violation of the solemn agreement of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, as we contemplate the destructive potentialities of any future large-scale resort to force, any thoughtful man or nation is driven to a sober conclusion.

In a very real sense the world no longer has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to survive, it must choose the rule of law. On this Law Day, then, we honor not only the principle of the rule of law but also those judges, legislators, lawyers, and law-abiding citizens who actively work to preserve our liberties under law.

Let history record that on Law Day free man's faith in the rule of law and justice is greater than ever before. And let us trust that this faith will be vindicated for the benefit of all mankind.

<sup>1</sup> Recorded in advance for television and radio observance of Law Day.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1958, p. 293.

## Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser

by Loftus Becker  
Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>

The topic that you have chosen for discussion at this meeting of the society—"International Law and the Political Process"—has a very real meaning for those of us who are charged with legal responsibilities in the Department. One of the first things that we learn is that abstract conceptions of international law, as it should be, must, of necessity, be qualified in application by the realities of the political process.

I know that there are those who assert that international law, in order to be worth its salt, must be based solely upon logic and principle. But international law, notwithstanding the reasoned theses of the commentators, consists, in the last analysis, of those principles upon which sovereign nations can agree. Such agreement is seldom, if ever, reached without regard to the political process.

Please do not imply from my remarks that I would throw logic and principle overboard in favor of pure political pragmatism. There is, however, a mean, a balancing between legal theory and political capabilities, that must be taken into account both in the formulation and in the application of the principles of international law.

The panel discussions upon which you have been engaged here are by no means abstract or academic insofar as the office of the Legal Adviser is concerned. The first time that I looked over your program I was impressed to note that important problems under each of the topics under discussion here had been brought before me personally, even though I have been with the Department for only a short time. That is the reason for the subject I have chosen, for I thought that it might

be of interest to you to have explained the context in which such problems are presented to the Legal Adviser.

Very often the Department of State is urged in the strongest terms to make a greater effort to induce other nations to refer their disputes to established international tribunals. We are, of course, in complete sympathy with these proposals and seize upon every opportunity to do just that.

One of the major political problems which we encounter in so doing arises from the fact that the submission of the United States to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice contains a reservation, commonly referred to as the "Connally rider." This, as you know, is to the effect that this Government's submission to the Court's jurisdiction does not apply to disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America, *as determined by the United States of America*. A number of other states have reservations similar to or identical with that of the United States, while still others have an even broader reservation with respect to the matters which may be kept from the Court by unilateral determination.

I shall not attempt to interpret the precise meaning of the United States reservation under the Connally rider, but it is clearly more restrictive than a reservation of the right not to submit matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, *as determined by the principles of international law*.

There can be little doubt that reservations of this type have tended to minimize the number of disputes determined by the International Court of Justice, particularly in view of the possibility

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 26 (press release 224).



that a state which does not have such a reservation may, when sued by one which does, invoke the doctrine of "reciprocity."

So long as the Connally rider continues in existence, it is the obligation of the Department of State to act in accordance with its provisions. The question of whether or not this rider should be deleted or watered down is essentially political. Specifically, the issue is whether the United States, in order to promote a more widespread recourse to the legal processes of the Court, is willing to take the lead in sacrificing to some extent its ability to make a unilateral determination of what is or is not a matter essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. Those of you who believe that it should must seek your relief through political processes.

Personally, I believe that such an effort would be worth while, for we cannot in all honesty urge upon others a course of action which we ourselves are not prepared to adopt. Moreover, I have a serious question whether "as determined by the United States of America," if fairly applied, would mean any more in the way of excluding the International Court from passing upon truly domestic issues than the words "as determined by the principles of international law."

When I stated that it is the obligation of the Department of State to act in accordance with the provisions of the Connally rider so long as that reservation is on the books, I did not intend to state or imply that we in the Department regard it as our duty to determine that all matters involving the United States brought before the International Court are of "essentially domestic concern."

#### **The Interhandel Case**

A case in point is the position taken by the Department of State, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, in the preliminary stages of the well-known *Interhandel* case now pending before the International Court of Justice. Since the case is now pending before the Court, it would not be appropriate for me to discuss its merits. It is appropriate, however, for me to inform you as to the position that this Government took on the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court to indicate interim measures, since, so far as I have been able to ascertain, there has been some misunderstanding on this point in the public mind.

Shortly after Switzerland filed its application against the United States,<sup>2</sup> it requested that the Court indicate certain interim measures to be observed by the United States during the pendency of the international proceeding. One of the measures requested was an indication that the United States Government should not during this period sell certain vested shares of General Aniline & Film Corporation.

In responding to this request the United States Government informed the Court that it had determined that the matter of the sale of the General Aniline & Film shares was one of "essentially domestic concern" and that, therefore, the Court lacked the power to give any indication as to what the United States should do respecting the sale of these shares. The Court agreed with the United States in result, but, in so doing, the majority of the Court relied not upon our rationale but upon certain supervening circumstances, including the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States in a domestic case involving *Interhandel*.

I cannot and do not wish to discuss the merits of the Court's decision. The one thing that I wish to make clear is that, in arguing our case before the Court, I, as agent for the United States, was authorized as a matter of policy to make the following statement, and I quote from the transcript of the oral argument:

The United States Government by its Preliminary Objection of October 9, 1957, does not intend to imply that it envisages use of paragraph (b) of the Condition dated August 14, 1946, with respect to all aspects of the *Interhandel* controversy which may be involved in the submission of October 1, 1957. The United States Government will in due course, upon further study, disclose its position in these respects in further detail.

The United States Government intends, during the pendency of future proceedings on the Application filed by Switzerland on October 1, 1957, not to dispose of the proceeds which will be derived from the sale of the shares of General Aniline & Film. In that connection, it is our duty to point out to the Court that under the Constitution of the United States the legislative and judicial branches of the United States Government are independent and they cannot be legally bound by a statement of

<sup>2</sup>The Swiss application to the Court followed the refusal of the United States to arbitrate respecting the matter under the Washington Accord of 1946 or the U.S.-Swiss treaty of 1931. For text of a U.S. note of Jan. 11, 1957, and accompanying memorandum setting forth detailed reasons for the U.S. position, see *BULLETIN* of Mar. 4, 1957, p. 350.

intention on the part of the Executive Branch of the United States Government which I represent.

The point is this. It was made plain to the Court that the sole issue in the *Interhandel* case, to which the original preliminary objection based upon the Connally rider was addressed, was whether or not the United States was entitled to make a sale of the General Aniline & Film shares while the case before the International Court was pending.

The United States has not as yet indicated its position with respect to the remaining issues in the case. It will do so at the appropriate time, namely, at the time additional preliminary objections are filed, if any are to be filed. In the meantime we have assured the Court that our reliance upon the Connally rider on the single issue of the sale of the General Aniline & Film shares should not be taken as any indication that our Government will rely upon that reservation in order completely to defeat the jurisdiction of the International Court.

Naturally I cannot here indicate the position that the United States will take upon each of the remaining issues of the case. I would suggest, however, that those who have been critical of the position taken by the United States in this proceeding reserve further comment until that position has finally been disclosed.

#### **The Girard Case**

Turning now to another subject, that of jurisdiction over American armed forces stationed abroad, I recall vividly that the *Girard* case became a national issue during my first week in the Department. That case, as you all know, was a hard case, which might well have made bad law. Strong public pressures were exerted upon the two Departments concerned—State and Defense<sup>3</sup>—and upon the Congress. Such pressures were based upon a misunderstanding or a refusal to understand the applicable rule of international law that any sovereign state has the right to impose such conditions as it sees fit upon the stationing of foreign troops within its territory.

There was no doubt in our mind as to the applicable principle of international law and, as well, no doubt as to the fact that the United States

Government, acting in accordance with the provisions of an agreement with Japan, had made a commitment which it could not in honor retract. Because of this we felt impelled to stand upon the law and to fulfill our international commitment, despite the heavy political pressures brought to bear upon us. That is what we did, and our view as to the law was sustained by the Supreme Court.

The lesson to be drawn from the *Girard* case, as I view it, is that there are instances where the stated requirements of the political process cannot be reconciled with established principles of international law. In such a case the Legal Adviser may be overruled, but he cannot acquiesce.

#### **Conference on Law of the Sea**

Now I should like to discuss with you some personal observations as to the conditions under which international law is being formulated today.

On February 24, 1958, there was convened in Geneva, Switzerland, an International Conference on the Law of the Sea. Eighty-six states are participating in this conference, which is now drawing to a close—more than double the number that attended the Hague conference of 1930. We regard this conference as one of the most important of those convened since the end of World War II.

Perhaps the most important single issue that came before this conference was the breadth of the territorial sea in which a state may exercise sovereign rights.<sup>4</sup> That is the sole issue to which I shall advert this evening.

As all of you know, the United States adopted a 3-mile limit for its territorial sea in 1793 and our Government has not since departed from that position. The United States Government believes that the 3-mile limit, which affords a maximum freedom of the seas, is in the best interests of all states—large and small, old and new.

By the latter part of the 19th century or the early part of the 20th century, the 3-mile limit was firmly established as customary international law. It has been the consistent position of the Department of State that no greater breadth of territorial sea can be justified in international law, and numerous protests have been filed on this basis when broader claims have been asserted.

<sup>3</sup> For a joint statement by Secretary Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1957, p. 1000.

<sup>4</sup> For a statement by Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the U.S. delegation, see *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1958, p. 574.

There have, of course, been various states which have asserted from time to time a right to a broader territorial sea—to 6, to 12, and even to 200 miles. In some instances such broader claims have been based upon security grounds, as, for example, in the case of the U.S.S.R., which claims 12 miles. In other instances these broader claims were based upon the alleged economic requirements of the coastal states, which maintained that they were entitled to appropriate to their own use all fishing grounds lying between 3 and 12 miles off their coasts or even farther, even though such offshore fishing grounds had theretofore been regarded as the common property of all nations. Insofar as the United States is concerned, such unilateral appropriations of vast areas of the high seas are contrary to the common good, contrary to our own security interests, and contrary to the valuable economic interests of our overseas fishing industry.

Unfortunately, at Geneva, from which I have just now returned, there was a minimum of debate and even less inclination to vote upon the merits, as principles of international law, of the various specific proposals submitted for conference approval. The reasons for this are even more important than the proposals made and the various votes cast for or against them, which I shall not attempt to detail.

The principle of the freedom of the seas, with its corollary, the 3-mile limit, was established before many of the states represented at the Geneva conference had gained their independence. In large measure at the conference such states made no serious effort to weigh the advantages they might retain by maintaining the freedom of the seas as against the disadvantages of an extension of territorial seas, such as the obligation of patrolling such an expanded territorial sea. They opposed the 3-mile limit upon the ground that it had been adopted by the major maritime powers before they had come into existence. For that reason alone, the preexisting rule had to be changed. That was regarded as progress.

Such states, moreover, took the position that they must be free to fix the breadth of their territorial sea up to 12 miles or to exercise exclusive fishing control for the same distance from their coasts because that was the only rule that would be consistent with their dignity and sovereignty as new nations.

These same new states regarded the freedom of the high seas—rather than as a common heritage—as a legal fiction invented by the major maritime nations, or their lawyers, in order to rob the populations of newly created nations of the living resources of the seas located off their coasts. Those other states which desired to fish up to 3 miles off the coasts of these newly created nations, or to overfly the high seas between 3 and 12 miles off their coasts without express permission, were regarded as motivated wholly by selfish motives. The use of large mother or cannery ships off coastal waters was frequently denounced as a means of taking the bread out of the mouths of local coastal fishermen operating out of port on small boats on a 1-day basis.

They were wholly unmoved by the fact that a nation such as Portugal had fished for centuries on the high seas off the coasts of other nations and relied upon such fishing for the protein in the diet of its population, particularly the poorer elements thereof.

Those who opposed a coastal state's legal right to annex neighboring areas of the high seas in order to improve its economic position—additional land being unavailable—were denounced as reactionary or predatory.

These same new nations viewed as progressive and desirable—because it constituted a change from the existing order—the Mexican proposal, supported without deviation by the entire Soviet bloc, that the territorial sea could be fixed by the coastal state anywhere between 3 and 12 miles off its coast.

#### **Bloc Voting**

With these views there was combined the practice of bloc voting. The entire Soviet bloc came to the conference instructed to support a 12-mile limit and never deviated from this position from beginning to end of the conference. The Arab bloc in its entirety was also pledged to the 12-mile limit, and the members of that bloc had no hesitance in declaring that their position was principally motivated by their desire to close off the Gulf of Aqaba. Argument or persuasion, even with the most friendly members of that bloc, was wholly wasted. A vote against this principle by any member of the bloc for any reason whatever was regarded as disloyalty to the bloc.

In caucuses of the Afro-Asian and the Latin American blocs every effort was made to exert pressure to insure that members of the bloc would vote as a unit. Even countries to which the United States had extended extensive aid and which have a long record of friendship with the United States deemed themselves bound to vote solidly with the other bloc members. Nations which indicated an intention to vote in favor of the United States, contrary to the bloc, were threatened with economic reprisals.

In one instance, in Committee I, when it appeared that the chairman was about to announce a tie vote on the optional 3- to 12-mile proposal advanced by Mexico, one delegate favoring this proposal ran to the seat of a South American delegate and sought to coerce him into changing his vote from abstention to an affirmative vote in favor of the Mexican proposal not only by shouting at him but also by lifting his arm in order to attract the attention of the chair. I am glad to note that, even though the other delegate was coerced into making this attempt, the chairman ruled that the vote, once having been made and recorded, could not thereafter be changed, and his ruling was sustained on appeal by a vote of 48 to 17 with 17 abstentions. The tactics used in that instance clearly shocked the conscience of the conference.

These, I regret to say, are the practicalities of the development of one branch of international law today. Principle, reason, and persuasion, as well as common security interests of the utmost importance, are subordinated to "ward politics" of the most ruthless character. Whether we like it or not, this is a political reality of which we must take account.

We are fortunate, indeed, that, notwithstanding the attitudes and practices that I have just described, the compromise proposal made by the United States at Geneva gained the largest majority of any of those voted upon in plenary session (45-33-7), although none received the two-thirds required for conference approval. This, I should like to make plain, we owe to the outstanding performance of the United States delegation under the leadership of Mr. Arthur Dean of New York, who is well known to most of those here present. This result could not have been accomplished, moreover, had not a number of our good friends firmly resisted bloc pressure to vote against us.

The United States Government has made it plain that unless the conference approved its compromise proposal—involving a 6-mile territorial sea with a contiguous fishing zone of an additional 6 miles, in which historical fishing rights would have to be respected by the coastal state—this Government would continue to conform, and to expect others to conform, to the 3-mile limit now firmly established as customary international law. It is interesting to note that, as among the 3-, 6-, and 12-mile limits, the 3-mile limit was the only one that was not expressly rejected by the Geneva conference.

The attitudes and activities of the newly formed nations and the members of blocs at the Geneva conference pose a serious and continuing problem for which I have no immediate answer. Such attitudes and activities in the political sphere are regrettable, but they are even more reprehensible when they appear at a conference dedicated to the statement, the codification, or the formulation of sound international law.

I do not wish to end upon too gloomy a note. The 86 nations represented at Geneva did get together constructively in order to agree upon many important facets of the law of the sea. These included agreement upon important rules relating to fisheries, to the high seas generally, and to the continental shelf, the last mentioned being the first time agreement has been reached upon this principle.

As far as this Government is concerned, the United States comes out of the Geneva conference with a greatly enhanced international reputation. I was deeply impressed by the fact that speaker after speaker, even those who were opposing the United States proposal, paid tribute to the honesty and sincerity of the United States and its clearly demonstrated willingness to compromise and, in so doing, to sacrifice valuable interests of its own. The attitude of our Government and its delegation compared most favorably with the monolithic immobility of the U.S.S.R. and its bloc. Again, we owe a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. Dean and the members of the delegation and their advisers.

As a closing note, I may inform you that the next political problem upon which the Legal Adviser will have occasion to speak involves, not the depths of the sea, but the far reaches of outer space.



## Import Quota on Tung Nuts

White House press release dated April 28

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President has adopted the unanimous recommendation of the U.S. Tariff Commission in the case of tung nuts. Accordingly, the President issued a proclamation subjecting imports of tung nuts to the existing quota on imports of tung oil established by the President's proclamation of September 9, 1957,<sup>1</sup> under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended.

On February 19, 1958,<sup>2</sup> the President requested the Tariff Commission to investigate the need for restricting imports of tung nuts. The Commission reported on March 19, 1958, its unanimous findings and recommendation. The Commission's investigation and report were made pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, which authorizes the limitation of imports that interfere with the price-support programs of the Department of Agriculture.

The proclamation also makes a technical adjustment which provides that only direct shipments from supplying countries may be imported under the quota on tung oil and tung nuts.

### PROCLAMATION 3236<sup>3</sup>

#### IMPOSING IMPORT QUOTAS ON TUNG NUTS

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), the Secretary of Agriculture advised me he had reason to believe that tung nuts are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to tung nuts and tung oil, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic tung nuts or tung oil with respect to which such program of the Department of Agriculture is being undertaken; and

WHEREAS, on February 19, 1958, I caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation under the said section 22 with respect to this matter; and

WHEREAS the said Tariff Commission has made such investigation, and has reported to me its findings and recommendation made in connection therewith; and

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said investigation and report of the Tariff Commission, I find that tung nuts are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to interfere materially with the said price-support program; and

WHEREAS I find and declare that the imposition of the limitations on imports of tung nuts hereinafter proclaimed is shown by such investigation of the Tariff Commission to be necessary in order that the entry of tung nuts will not materially interfere with the said price-support program; and

WHEREAS, on September 9, 1957, I issued Proclamation No. 3200 (22 F. R. 7265) limiting the quantity of tung oil that may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the periods specified in that proclamation; and

WHEREAS I find that the limitations on imports of tung nuts hereinafter proclaimed will not reduce the permissible total quantity of tung nuts which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption to proportionately less than 50 per centum of the average annual quantity of tung nuts entered during the representative period from November 1, 1952, to October 31, 1956, inclusive:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that no tung nuts shall be permitted to be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in any quota period specified in the proclamation of September 9, 1957, after the total aggregate quantity of tung nuts and tung oil entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in any such quota period has reached, in terms of oil, the equivalent of the quota for tung oil specified in that proclamation for such quota period. For the purposes of this proclamation the oil content of tung nuts shall be computed on the basis of 15.9 pounds for each 100 pounds of whole nuts, and on the basis of 35.8 pounds of oil for each 100 pounds of decorticated nuts.

In order to assure equitable treatment to supplying countries, all tung oil and tung nuts entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption pursuant to the proclamation of September 9, 1957, or this proclamation, shall have been a direct shipment destined to the United States on an original through bill of lading from the country of production.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 28th day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and

[SEAL] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
Secretary of State

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1957, p. 542.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 468.

<sup>3</sup> 23 Fed. Reg. 2959.

## Renegotiation of Fruit and Vegetable Concessions by Canada

Press release 214 dated April 24

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Committee for Reciprocity Information on trade agreement matters is requesting views from interested persons on certain additional modifications of tariff concessions which Canada proposes to negotiate under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Views are requested with respect to the attached list of fruit and vegetable concessions to be modified. No U.S. tariff reductions are involved.

On September 16, 1957, and again on November 8, 1957, the Committee for Reciprocity Information announced U.S. participation in tariff negotiations at Geneva arising from the desire of Canada and other countries to modify or withdraw certain of their GATT concessions.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Canada has announced its intention to negotiate the modification of concessions on certain fresh and canned fruits and vegetables. Most of these concessions were initially negotiated with the United States. The proposed modifications consist chiefly of increases of the higher specific rates of duty now applicable during particular seasons and of the length of the period for which such higher seasonal rates of duty are applied.

During July, August, and September 1957 the Canadian Tariff Board held public hearings in the course of an investigation ordered by the Minister of Finance respecting the production, distribution, and imports of fruits and vegetables. The Board recommended certain tariff changes, which are shown on the attached listing. These recommendations do not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Government.

Under procedures established by the Contracting Parties to the agreement, a country proposing to renegotiate a concession by modifying or withdrawing it is required to negotiate regarding compensatory adjustments with the country with

which the concession was originally negotiated and with any other country having a principal supplying interest in the concession item. It is required to consult with countries having a substantial trade interest. In such negotiations the country proposing the modification or withdrawal usually offers new concessions by way of compensation. If no settlement is possible on the basis of such new concessions as may be offered, the countries adversely affected may withdraw or make upward adjustment of one or more concessions to the first country which are of a value substantially equivalent to the concession which the first country is modifying or withdrawing.

The Committee for Reciprocity Information is an interagency group which receives the views of interested persons regarding proposed or existing trade agreements. The committee consists of a member of the U.S. Tariff Commission and representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury, and the International Cooperation Administration.

In preparation for the proposed negotiations with Canada the Committee for Reciprocity Information would welcome views from interested parties with regard to the possible effect on U.S. trade of modification or withdrawal of the concessions on the items in the attached list. In addition the committee invites the submission of views regarding concessions which the United States might seek from Canada as compensation, as well as views concerning possible upward adjustment in U.S. rates of duty on commodities of which Canada is an important supplier and which are now the subject of concessions to Canada in the General Agreement.

Views on the foregoing matters should be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information by the close of business on June 16, 1958. All communications, in 15 copies, should be addressed to: The Secretary of the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C.

If any interested party considers that his views cannot be adequately expressed to the committee in a written brief, he should make this known to the secretary of the committee, who will then arrange for oral presentation before the committee.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1957, p. 581, and Nov. 25, 1957, p. 850.

# LIST OF ITEMS

GATT Concessions on Certain Fresh and Canned Fruits and Vegetables Proposed for Modification by Canada

Tariff item number	Description of product	Present rate of duty	Canadian Tariff Board recommendations*
83 (b)	New potatoes (January 1-June 14, inclusive)	Free	No duty-free period
84 (b)	Onions, in their natural state, n. o. p., per lb. (40 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1½¢ Split period: maximum 44 weeks
85 (a)	Mushrooms, fresh . . . per pound (52 weeks maximum)	3½¢ or 10 p. c.	5¢
85 (b)	Mushrooms, dried or otherwise preserved	12½ p. c.	15 p. c.
87 (a)	Asparagus . . . per pound (8 weeks maximum)	3½¢ or 10 p. c.	3½¢ - 14 weeks maximum
87 (c)	Brussels sprouts	10 p. c.	3¢ - 16 weeks maximum
87 (d)	Cabbage . . . per pound (Split period: maximum 26 weeks)	½¢ or 10 p. c.	½¢ - Split period: maximum 30 weeks
EX 87 (e)	Carrots . . . per pound (Split period: maximum 26 weeks)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1¢ - Split period: maximum 40 weeks
87 (f)	Cauliflower, fresh . . . per pound (12 weeks maximum)	¾¢ or 10 p. c.	¾¢ - Split period: maximum 20 weeks
87 (g)	Celery . . . per pound (Split period: maximum 24 weeks)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	2¢ - Split period: maximum 24 weeks
87 (h)	Cucumbers (except for pickling) . . . per pound (12 weeks maximum)	2½¢ or 10 p. c.	2½¢ - Split period: maximum 22 weeks
87 (i)	Lettuce . . . per pound (Split period: maximum 18 weeks)	.85¢ or 10 p. c.	.85¢ - Split period: maximum 26 weeks
EX 87 (p)	Witloof or endive	Free	10 p. c.
87 (q)	Eggplant	Free	10 p. c.
EX 87 (r)	Peppers	10 p. c.	1¢ - 8 weeks maximum
EX 87 (r)	Parsnips	10 p. c.	1¢ - Split period: maximum 36 weeks
EX 87 (r)	Corn on the cob	10 p. c.	1½¢ - 8 weeks maximum
EX 89 (e)	Canned asparagus	15 p. c.	22½ p. c.
EX 90 (e)	Asparagus, frozen	17½ p. c.	22½ p. c.
EX 90 (e)	Brussels sprouts, frozen	17½ p. c.	22½ p. c.
92 (a)	Apricots . . . per pound (10 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1½¢
EX 92 (b)	Cherries, sour . . . per pound (7 weeks maximum)	2¢ or 10 p. c.	3¢ - 10 weeks maximum
92 (c)	Cranberries . . . per pound (12 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	2¢
92 (d)	Peaches . . . per pound (9 weeks maximum)	1½¢ or 10 p. c.	2¢
92 (e)	Pears . . . per pound (15 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1¢ - 22 weeks maximum
EX 92 (f)	Fresh prunes . . . per pound (10 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1½¢ - 12 weeks maximum
EX 105 (f)	Cranberry jelly and cranberry sauce or preserve . . . per pound	3¢	3½¢
EX 105 (i)	Cherries, frozen . . . per pound	2¢	3¢
EX 105 (i)	Peaches, frozen . . . per pound	2¢	2½¢
109 (a)	Peaches, canned . . . per pound	2¢	2½¢
EX 106 (b)	Apricots, canned . . . per pound	2¢	2½¢
EX 106 (e)	Cherries, canned . . . per pound	1¢	1½¢
EX 106 (e)	Prunes, canned . . . per pound	1¢	1½¢

The Canadian Tariff Board also recommended an additional duty of 5 percent on green beans, brussels sprouts, carrots, beets, cauliflower, lettuce, peas, parsnips, or corn on the cob, when imported during the period of application of the seasonal specific duty, in packages weighing 5 pounds or less.

\* Report by the Tariff Board Relative to the Investigation Ordered by the Minister of Finance Respecting Fruits and Vegetables, Reference No. 124, Oct. 15, 1957.

The Board recommends no change in the off-season rate of duty of 10 percent ad valorem where it is at present applied.

The recommendations of the Canadian Tariff Board do not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Government.

## President Amends Procedures on U.S. Citizens Employed by U.N.

White House press release dated April 23

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on April 23 issued an Executive order relating to investigation of U.S. citizens employed or being considered for employment on the secretariat of the United Nations.

Heretofore it has been required, under Executive Order No. 10422,<sup>1</sup> that a full field investigation be conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in all cases involving U.S. citizens employed or being considered for employment on the internationally recruited staff of the United Nations for a period exceeding 90 days. The order issued on April 23 transfers the jurisdiction to investigate these cases to the Civil Service Commission. However, the Commission will continue to refer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full field investigation cases in which there is developed derogatory information reflecting on the loyalty of the individual concerned.

The change effected by this order implements one of the recommendations of the Commission on Government Security (the Wright Commission). It is anticipated that the time elapsing between the initiation and completion of an investigation will be shortened considerably under the order and that substantial annual savings in expenditures for investigations will be realized.

### EXECUTIVE ORDER 10763<sup>2</sup>

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10422, AS AMENDED, PRESCRIBING PROCEDURES FOR MAKING AVAILABLE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES CITIZENS EMPLOYED OR BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT ON THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> 23 Fed. Reg. 2767.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Part I of Executive Order No. 10422 of January 9, 1953, as amended by Executive Order No. 10459<sup>3</sup> of June 2, 1953, be, and they are hereby, amended to read as follows:

"2. The Secretary of State shall forward the information received from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the United States Civil Service Commission, and the Commission shall conduct an investigation.

"3. The investigation conducted by the Civil Service Commission shall be a full background investigation conforming to the investigative standards of the Civil Service Commission, and shall include reference to the following:

- (a) Federal Bureau of Investigation files.
- (b) Civil Service Commission files.
- (c) Military and naval intelligence files as appropriate.
- (d) The files of any other appropriate Government investigative or intelligence agency.
- (e) The files of appropriate committees of the Congress.
- (f) Local law-enforcement files at the place of residence and employment of the person, including municipal, county, and State law-enforcement files.
- (g) Schools and colleges attended by the person.
- (h) Former employers of the person.
- (i) References given by the person.
- (j) Any other appropriate source.

However, in the case of short-term employees whose employment does not exceed ninety days, such investigation need not include reference to subparagraphs (f) through (j) of this paragraph.

"4. Whenever information disclosed with respect to any person being investigated is derogatory, within the standard set forth in Part II of this order, the United States Civil Service Commission shall forward such information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau shall conduct a full field investigation of such person."

This order shall become effective on July 1, 1958.

*Dwight D. Eisenhower*

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
April 23, 1958.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of June 22, 1953, p. 882.



## 9th Plenary Assembly of CCIR To Meet at Los Angeles in 1959

The Department of State announced on April 28 (press release 227) the acceptance of Mayor Norris Poulson's invitation to hold the 9th plenary assembly of the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) at Los Angeles, Calif., from April 2 to 30, 1959.

The International Radio Consultative Committee is one of the principal organs of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and is concerned with the improvement of radio communications throughout the world. The work of the CCIR [Comité consultatif international des radiocommunications] is carried on largely by special study groups which examine technical radio questions. Meeting every 3 years, the plenary assemblies of the CCIR adopt the recommendations of these study groups, formulate a program of study-group activity for the 3-year period until the next assembly, and decide administrative and budgetary matters for the operation of the CCIR.

The plenary assembly will provide an excellent forum for the exchange of information between American radio communications experts and their counterparts from all over the world. Official delegations from some 50 countries as well as representatives from private operating agencies, international organizations, science, and industry are expected to attend the CCIR plenary assembly.

### TREATY INFORMATION

## President Withdraws Certain Treaties From the Senate

*Message of President Eisenhower*

White House press release dated April 22

*To the Senate of the United States:* With a view to further study and consideration of certain treaties in the light of developments since they were formulated, and in order to assist the Senate in

placing its Treaty Calendar on a relatively current basis, I desire to withdraw from the Senate the following treaties and understanding:

Executive C, 80th Congress, 1st Session—

Conciliation treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Manila November 16, 1946.

Executive T, 80th Congress, 1st Session—

Convention Concerning Social Security for Seafarers, adopted by the International Labor Conference, Seattle, June 6-29, 1946 (ILO Convention No. 70).

Executive HH, 80th Congress, 1st Session—

Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Works, signed at Washington June 22, 1946 (Inter-American Copyright Convention).

Executive G, 81st Congress, 1st Session—

Convention Concerning Statistics of Wages and Hours of Work in the Principal Mining and Manufacturing Industries, Including Building and Construction, and in Agriculture, adopted by the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 2-22, 1938 (ILO Convention No. 63).

Executive B, 82d Congress, 1st Session—

Convention Concerning the Organization of the Employment Service, adopted by the International Labor Conference, San Francisco, June 17-July 10, 1948 (ILO Convention No. 88).

Executive H, 82d Congress, 1st Session—

Understanding with respect to ILO Convention No. 63, concerning statistics of wages and hours of work in principal mining and manufacturing industries, including building and construction, and in agriculture.

Executive J, 82d Congress, 1st Session—

Convention Concerning Vacation Holidays With Pay for Seafarers, adopted by the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949 (ILO Convention No. 91).

Executive K, 82d Congress, 1st Session—

Convention Concerning Crew Accommodations on Board Ship (revised 1949), adopted by the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949 (ILO Convention No. 92).

Executive L, 82d Congress, 1st Session—

Convention Concerning Wages, Hours of Work on Board Ship and Manning (revised 1949), adopted by the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949 (ILO Convention No. 93).

If found to be desirable in the light of the further study and consideration, one or more of the treaties listed above may be resubmitted with a fresh appraisal of their provisions.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
April 22, 1958

## Agreement Concluded With Argentina on Meteorological Sampling Tests

Press release 226 dated April 28

The United States and Argentina have concluded an agreement under which the U.S. Air Force is authorized to conduct in Argentina, for a period of about 18 months, meteorological sampling tests in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere. The U.S. Air Force unit will consist of approximately 150 members and equipment necessary to insure successful completion of its scientific research task.

The final conclusions drawn from the tests, which will be available upon completion of the program, are expected to be of general scientific value and will be furnished to the Government of Argentina. It is believed that the scientific data gained will make the sampling program of benefit to both countries. The valuable support extended by the Argentine Government and the Argentine Air Force to this scientific research mission is another example of the cooperative spirit existing between the two countries.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.  
*Ratification deposited:* Belgium, April 29, 1958.

#### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signature and acceptance:* Morocco, April 25, 1958.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Morocco, April 25, 1958.

#### Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

*Adherence effective:* Ireland, May 14, 1958.

## Safety at Sea

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic ice patrol. Opened for signature at Washington January 4, 1956. Entered into force July 5, 1956. TIAS 3597.

*Acceptance deposited:* Liberia, April 23, 1958.

### BILATERAL

#### Brazil

Reciprocal trade agreement. Signed at Washington February 2, 1935. Entered into force January 1, 1936. 49 Stat. 3808.

*Terminates:* June 19, 1958.<sup>1</sup>

Agreement supplementing reciprocal trade agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro April 17, 1935. Entered into force January 1, 1936. 49 Stat. 3808.

*Terminates:* June 19, 1958.<sup>1</sup>

Agreement supplementing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of October 30, 1947 (TIAS 1700). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro June 30, 1948. Entered into force June 30, 1948. TIAS 1811.

*Terminates:* June 19, 1958.<sup>1</sup>

#### Colombia

Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding attached to the agricultural commodities agreement of March 14, 1958 (TIAS 4015). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá March 20 and April 23, 1958. Entered into force April 23, 1958.

Agreement further amending the memorandum of understanding attached to the agricultural commodities agreement of March 14, 1958 (TIAS 4015). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá April 10 and 23, 1958. Entered into force April 23, 1958.

#### Iran

Air transport agreement. Signed at Tehran January 16, 1957.

*Entered into force:* April 17, 1958 (date of receipt by the United States of notification by Iran of its ratification).

#### Nicaragua

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Managua January 21, 1956.

*Ratifications exchanged:* April 24, 1958.

*Enters into force:* May 24, 1958.

#### Philippines

Agreements supplementing and amending the military assistance agreement of April 27, 1955 (TIAS 3231), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 14, 1958. Entered into force April 14, 1958.

#### Spain

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of January 27, 1958 (TIAS 4010). Signed at Madrid April 10, 1958. Entered into force April 10, 1958.

<sup>1</sup> Notice of intention to terminate given by Brazil Dec. 19, 1957.

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### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 28-May 4

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Releases issued prior to April 28 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 214 of April 24, 222 of April 25, and 224 of April 26.

No.	Date	Subject
†225	4/28	Delegation to NATO ministerial meeting.
226	4/28	U.S.-Argentine agreement on meteorological sampling tests.
227	4/28	CCIR assembly to be held at Los Angeles (rewrite).
†228	4/29	Delegation to 41st (maritime) session of International Labor Conference (rewrite).
*229	4/30	Five FSO's sworn in as career ministers.
230	4/29	U.S.-Soviet meetings on film exchanges.
*231	4/30	Shipment of pesticide to Iran.
*232	4/30	Merchant, Whiteman to receive National Civil Service League awards.
233	4/30	U.S. release of blocked Egyptian funds.
234	5/1	Dulles: Arctic inspection zone (combined with No. 236).
†235	5/1	Holmes: "The United States and Africa: An Official Viewpoint."
236	5/1	Dulles: news conference.
†237	5/2	Dulles: departure for NATO meeting.
†238	5/2	Robertson: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
239	5/2	Dulles: "The Strategy of Peace."
239-A	5/2	Partial revision of above text.
†240	5/2	Haitian financial mission.
†241	5/3	Tripartite statement on summit meeting.
242	5/4	Reply to Polish note on Rapacki Plan.
*243	5/2	Delegation to inauguration of Costa Rican President.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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## TREATIES IN FORCE

### A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1958

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

The new edition of *Treaties in Force* (266 pp.) is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$1.25 a copy.

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